University of Baltimore Law

ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law
All Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Scholarship

10-2022

Beyond Window Dressing: Public Participation for Marginalized
Communities in the Datafied Society
Michele E. Gilman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac
Part of the Law Commons

ARTICLES
BEYOND WINDOW DRESSING: PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION FOR MARGINALIZED
COMMUNITIES IN THE DATAFIED SOCIETY
Michele Estrin Gilman*
We live in a datafied society in which our personal data is being constantly
harvested, analyzed, and sold by public and private entities, and yet we have
little control over our data and little voice in how it is used. In light of the
impacts of algorithmic decision-making systems—including those that run on
machine learning and artificial intelligence—there are increasing calls to
integrate public participation into the adoption, design, and oversight of
these tech tools. Stakeholder input is particularly crucial for members of
marginalized groups, who bear the disproportionate harms of data-centric
technologies. Yet, recent calls for public participation have been mostly
hortatory and without specific strategies or realistic recommendations. As
this Article explains, policy makers need not operate from a blank slate. For
decades, a variety of American statutory regimes have mandated public
participation, such as in the areas of environmental law, land use law, and
anti-poverty programs. Such mandates have had outsized effects on
communities suffering from economic disadvantage and racial and ethnic
discrimination. This Article contends that we should examine these
regulatory mandates in thinking about how to include the perspectives of
marginalized stakeholders in the datafied society. The core takeaway is that
meaningful public participation is extremely challenging and does not
happen without intentional and inclusive design. At its best, public input can
improve outputs and empower stakeholders. At its worst, it operates as a
form of “window dressing,” in which marginalized communities have no real
power to effect outcomes, thus generating distrust and alienation. Case
studies show that meaningful public participation is most likely to result
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when there are hard-law requirements for public participation and when
decision-makers operate transparently and recognize the value of the
public’s expertise. In addition, impacted communities must be provided with
capacity-building tools and resources to support their engagement. As
legislative proposals to enhance tech accountability—through algorithmic
impact assessments, audits, and other tools—gain steam, we must heed these
lessons.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2019, the landlord of Atlantic Plaza Towers in Brooklyn, New York,
told its tenants that their keys would be replaced with facial recognition
technology (FRT).1 Going forward, they would gaze into a camera rather
than use their keys to access their homes. According to the landlord, this
technology would lead to enhanced security.2 The tenants at the
rent-stabilized building, who were primarily low-income women of color,
felt differently. As tenant Icemae Downes said, “We should not feel like
we’re in a prison to enter into our homes.”3 The tenants jointly filed a formal
complaint, asserting that the technology is an “unnecessary invasive layer
1. Ginia Bellafante, The Landlord Wants Facial Recognition in Its Rent-Stabilized
Buildings. Why?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/28/
nyregion/rent-stabilized-buildings-facial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/TLY9-C9KZ].
2. Erin Durkin, New York Tenants Fight as Landlords Embrace Facial Recognition
Cameras, GUARDIAN (May 30, 2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2019/
may/29/new-york-facial-recognition-cameras-apartment-complex [https://perma.cc/W6MNV9KV].
3. Tanvi Misra, The Tenants Fighting Back Against Facial Recognition Technology,
BLOOMBERG (May 7, 2019, 1:35 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-0507/when-facial-recognition-tech-comes-to-housing [https://perma.cc/W5B6-APRG].
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which the Owner has yet to establish provides any additional or needed
security.”4 These tenants were well aware of the dangers of facial
recognition technology: its low accuracy rates for women and people of
color, with attendant risks of mistaken identity,5 its accessibility to law
enforcement without a warrant,6 and its chilling effects on free expression.7
After intense public scrutiny, the landlord ultimately dropped the plan.8 Yet,
if the landlord had asked for the tenants’ input in advance, or if the city had
adopted laws or guidance for tenant input into appropriate uses of algorithmic
decision-making systems, the situation may never have devolved into
protests and litigation. Perhaps, through public participation, the tenants and
the landlord could have identified building-access tools that did not demean
and demoralize tenants, while meeting the landlord’s proclaimed desire for
security. Without mechanisms for public input, that opportunity was lost.
In light of the impacts of algorithmic decision-making systems, including
those that run on machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI), there are
increasing calls to integrate public participation into the adoption, design, and
oversight of these tech tools.9 Within political theory and the field of public
4. The Owner’s Application for Modification of Servs. at 18, Nos. GS2100050D &
GS2100080D (N.Y. State Hous. & Cmty. Renewal Apr. 30, 2019),
https://www.legalservicesnyc.org/storage/PDFs/%20opposition%20to%20facial%20recognit
ion%20entry%20system%20app.pdf [https://perma.cc/G474-4BQ3].
5. Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy
Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. MACH. LEARNING RSCH. 77,
85–86 (2018) (error rates for lighter-skinned men were lower than 1 percent, while error rates
for women of color were up to 33 percent).
6. Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya & Jonathan Frankle, The Perpetual Line-Up:
Unregulated Police Face Regulation in America, GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIV. & TECH. (Oct. 18,
2016), https://www.perpetuallineup.org/ [https://perma.cc/A9PG-D43F].
7. See Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, The Inconsentability of Facial Surveillance,
66 LOY. L. REV. 101, 105 (2019).
8. Yasmin Gagne, How We Fought Our Landlord’s Secretive Plan for Facial
Recognition—and Won, FAST CO. (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90431686/
our-landlord-wants-to-install-facial-recognition-in-our-homes-but-were-fighting-back
[https://perma.cc/PK9F-U8HT].
9. See, e.g., Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights),
Rep. on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/74/493, at 14 (Oct. 11, 2019)
(explaining that, with regard to digital welfare systems, “meaningful input is rarely sought
from stakeholders and accountability mechanisms are absent”); Dorothy E. Roberts, Digitizing
the Carceral State, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1728 (2019) (reviewing VIRGINIA EUBANKS,
AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR
(2018)) (“[W]e could put in place democratic frameworks that allow the public, especially
people from the most marginalized communities, to participate in technology development
and management”); John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk
Assessment and the Future of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725, 1731 (2018) (arguing that,
with regard to pretrial risk assessments used in bail determinations, “the communities most
impacted by mass incarceration [should be] directly involved in shaping the tools and
frameworks”); Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 91 WASH. L.
REV. 1595, 1655 (2016) (describing the harms of surveillance technologies that result when
“the federal government fails to ensure that local elected officials and members of the public
are involved in decisions about surveillance technology acquisition”); Sarah Valentine,
Impoverished Algorithms: Misguided Governments, Flawed Technologies, and Social
Control, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 364, 376 (2019) (urging governments to provide “ample
opportunities for public input prior to purchasing big data systems”); Danielle Keats Citron,
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administration, public participation is touted for increasing knowledge about
problems and solutions, improving the outcome of decisions, and bringing
social values into technical and scientific decision-making.10 In addition, it
can imbue participants with greater civic skills, redistribute power, and
enhance the legitimacy of decision-making.11
Nevertheless, public
participation is not a panacea, and the barriers to meaningful participation are
many.12 It can be challenging for laypeople to participate when the policies
at issue are complex.13 Moreover, traditional participatory mechanisms
involve notice and comment and/or public hearings in which citizens can feel
like they are engaged in a ritualistic process with no real opportunity to have
an impact.14 Further, people who show up to participate tend to have greater
socioeconomic resources, while marginalized groups can struggle to access
participatory processes or to be taken seriously.15 Even worse, policy makers
Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1312 (2008) (“[A]gencies should
explore ways to allow the public to participate in the building of automated decision
systems.”); DILLON REISMAN, JASON SCHULTZ, KATE CRAWFORD & MEREDITH WHITTAKER,
AI NOW INST., ALGORITHMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENTS: A PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC
AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY 4
(2018),
https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5BC6-Y43K] (“Agencies should solicit public comments to clarify concerns
and answer outstanding questions . . . .”); BECKY CHAO, ERIC NULL, BRANDI COLLINS-DEXTER
& CLAIRE PARK, NEW AM., CENTERING CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE PRIVACY DEBATE 20 (2019),
https://d1y8sb8igg2f8e.cloudfront.net/documents/Centering_Civil_Rights_in_the_Privacy_
Debate_2019-09-17_152828.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3W9-GWU2] (“Impacted communities—
especially Black communities—must be included in discussions about privacy . . . .”); Margot
E. Kaminski & Gianclaudio Malgieri, Algorithmic Impact Assessments Under the GDPR:
Producing Multi-Layered Explanations, 11 INT’L DATA PRIV. L. 125, 139 (2021) (impact
assessments “should better involve and engage impacted individuals, not just through surveys
but through representative boards, before an algorithm is deployed”); AI NOW INST.,
CONFRONTING BLACK BOXES: A SHADOW REPORT OF THE NEW YORK CITY AUTOMATED
DECISION SYSTEM TASK FORCE 23 (Rashida Richardson ed., 2019), https://ainowinstitute.org/
ads-shadowreport-2019.html [https://perma.cc/7EDY-47UW] (agencies in New York City
should “ensure robust and comparable participation among experts and individuals affected
by ADS [(automated decision system)] use”); WORLD ECON. F., GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY
GOVERNANCE: A MULTISTAKEHOLDER APPROACH 4 (2019), https://www3.weforum.org/docs/
WEF_Global_Technology_Governance.pdf [https://perma.cc/WW7M-NQFB] (calling for
“participatory approaches to technology governance”).
10. See Ank Michels, Innovations in Democratic Governance: How Does Citizen
Participation Contribute to a Better Democracy?, 77 INT’L. REV. ADMIN. SCIS. 275, 278–79
(2011).
11. See Nancy Roberts, Public Deliberation in an Age of Direct Citizen Participation, 34
AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 315, 315–16 (2004) (summarizing arguments for and against citizen
participation); Judith E. Innes & David E. Booher, Reframing Public Participation: Strategies
for the 21st Century, 5 PLAN. THEORY & PRAC. 419, 423 (2004) (discussing purposes of public
participation, including “getting legitimacy for public decisions”).
12. See Renée A. Irvin & John Stansbury, Citizen Participation in Decision Making: Is
It Worth the Effort?, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 55, 58–60 (2004) (summarizing disadvantages of
citizen participation).
13. See generally Gene Rowe & Lynn J. Frewer, Public Participation Methods:
A Framework for Evaluation, 25 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 3, 5 (2000).
14. See Innes & Booher, supra note 11, at 423.
15. See LaToya Baldwin Clark, The Problem with Participation, MOD. AM., Summer
2013, at 20, 22 (“Participation . . . can only be a fair way to distribute resources if those called
to participate are equitably equipped to be full participants, and to capture scarce resources in
the form of services and attention.”); see also Archon Fung, Putting the Public Back into
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can use public participation as a form of “window dressing” to approve
controversial policies, generating distrust and potentially alienating
communities from the political process.16 In light of the power imbalances
embedded in technological systems, there is a growing concern that
“participation-washing,” or purely performative participation without
attention to power dynamics, could become the “next dangerous fad.”17
The stakes are high. We live in a datafied society in which our personal
data is being constantly harvested, analyzed, and sold by public and private
entities, and yet we have little control over our data and little voice in how it
is used.18 Businesses earn millions of dollars from consumers’ personal data,
using it to target people for ads urging them to book a certain hotel room or
to buy a certain running shoe, and then to decide how much they will pay for
those goods as compared to their neighbors.19 More significantly, the big
data ecosystem acts as a gatekeeper to life’s necessities, such as jobs,
housing, and education. Algorithms—or computerized decision-making
systems—determine who will be tracked by the police and who will roam
freely, who will obtain an affordable mortgage and who will be redlined into
predatory loans, and who will attend an affordable college to obtain a degree
that leads to a job and who will be targeted for high-interest loans at a
for-profit school that leaves them indebted and unlikely to graduate.20
Low-income people are usually on the losing end of these sorting
systems.21 They are relentlessly pursued across the internet with offers for
subprime financial products and services; indeed, an entire consumer
reporting industry exists to scrape data about vulnerable consumers and sell
it to interested industries.22 At the same time, they are excluded from
mainstream opportunities in employment, housing, education, health care,
Governance: The Challenges of Citizen Participation and Its Future, 75 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
513, 514–15 (2015); Innes & Booher, supra note 11, at 423.
16. See Jaime Alison Lee, “Can You Hear Me Now?”: Making Participatory Governance
Work for the Poor, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 405, 413–17 (2013) (describing the harms of
cosmetic participatory processes); Ngozi Okidegbe, The Democratizing Potential of
Algorithms?, 53 CONN. L. REV. 739, 745 (2022) (warning of the “veneer of communal
approval”).
17. Mona Sloane, Participation-Washing Could Be the Next Dangerous Fad in Machine
Learning, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/08/25/
1007589/participation-washing-ai-trends-opinion-machine-learning/
[https://perma.cc/YY26-AP68].
18. See SARAH E. IGO, THE KNOWN CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF PRIVACY IN MODERN AMERICA
353–55 (2018).
19. See generally WOLFIE CHRISTL, CRACKED LABS, CORPORATE SURVEILLANCE
IN
EVERYDAY
LIFE
(2017),
https://crackedlabs.org/dl/CrackedLabs_Christl_
CorporateSurveillance.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DV9-GPG2].
20. See Michele E. Gilman, Five Privacy Principles (from the GDPR) the United States
Should Adopt to Advance Economic Justice, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 368, 375–90 (2020) (describing
impacts of algorithmic decision-making on low-income people and minority groups).
21. See generally CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA
INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016).
22. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, LIST OF CONSUMER REPORTING COMPANIES
(2021), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_consumer-reporting-companieslist_2022-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/B764-KD7R].
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and financial services due to unfavorable digital profiling systems that amass
millions of data points about consumers and segment them into fine-grained
categories of worthiness. To obtain public benefits, low-income people must
navigate complex and often inaccessible online platforms that are not
designed with their needs in mind. These automated decision-making
systems often deny or reduce benefits without transparency or due process,
leaving thousands of people adrift without state support or any justification.23
Layered on top of this data profiling are surveillance tools, such as facial
recognition technology, that are increasingly deployed in workplaces,
schools, and public housing projects to control poor and underrepresented
populations.24
School surveillance of student computers feeds the
school-to-prison pipeline; predictive policing algorithms reinforce and
expand policies of over-policing and mass incarceration; and workplace
algorithms monitor low-wage workers and shape their performance in ways
that cause physical and psychological injuries.25 In short, marginalized
people disproportionately bear the brunt of harms in a datafied society.
As a result, in crafting public participation mandates for algorithmic
systems, the needs of marginalized persons should be central.26 Yet, recent
calls to center the voices of marginalized groups within public participation
mechanisms for technological systems have been mostly hortatory, without
specific strategies or realistic recommendations.27 Nevertheless, policy
makers need not operate from a blank slate. Various American statutory
regimes have mandated public participation for decades, such as in the areas
of environmental law, land use law, and anti-poverty programs, each of
which has outsized effects on communities suffering from economic
disadvantage and racial and ethnic discrimination. This Article contends that
we should examine these regulatory mandates for public participation in
thinking about how best to include the perspectives of marginalized
stakeholders in the datafied society in order to reduce the harmful impacts of
algorithmic systems on vulnerable communities. In surveying these other
regulatory regimes, the core takeaway is that meaningful inclusion of
23. See generally Valentine, supra note 9.
24. See Gilman, supra note 20, at 394–99.
25. Id. at 387.
26. In using the term “marginalized,” this Article does not intend to flatten the unique
experiences and histories of different groups and individuals in the United States. The term
is used to describe groups who have been subject to structural forms of oppression at the hands
of state and private entities, such as a denial of voting rights and political power, lack of equal
access to capital and job opportunities, and segregated housing and educational systems.
Despite these overlapping forms of oppression, these groups—which include Black, Latinx,
Indigenous, and Asian Americans, as well as low-income people of all racial, ethnic, and
gender backgrounds—have lengthy histories of resistance and resilience. In using the term
“marginalized,” this Article focuses on the largely shared experience of these groups, which
consists of newly emerging modes of oppression and discrimination that are embedded in
algorithmic systems. On the challenges of using anti-racist language that is accurate and
centers the experiences of the people being described, see generally Meera E. Deo, Why
BIPOC Fails, 107 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 115 (2021).
27. One notable exception is advanced by Okidegbe, supra note 16 (discussing the need
for input by marginalized communities in algorithms used in bail decisions).
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disadvantaged groups in policymaking is extremely challenging, and it fails
more often than it succeeds. The window dressing critique is a serious one.
Nevertheless, public participation can work when lawmakers and agencies
craft intentional and inclusionary structures that grant stakeholders some
level of power to effect outcomes. As public participation mandates are
integrated into new laws for algorithmic accountability, we should heed these
lessons.
Part I traces emerging tech governance statutes and proposals that adopt a
participatory norm. Algorithmic impact assessments (AIAs) have emerged
as the front-runner for enhancing fairness, transparency, and accountability;
they generally involve multiple stakeholders in a formal, evaluative process
that documents the anticipated impacts of algorithmic systems.
Unfortunately, most AIA proposals give short shrift to public participation
and thus risk involving citizens in mere window dressing processes—i.e.,
appearing to engage the public, but in fact using their presence to
rubber-stamp predetermined outcomes.
Part I compares AIAs to
participatory design principles and tech resistance movements, which also
bring public participation into the datafied society, but without a regulatory
mandate. Part II analyzes the theoretical foundation for folding public
participation into laws governing data-centric technologies.
Public
participation models differ widely in the amount of power they grant to
citizens, with consequences not only for the substantive legal regime at issue,
but also for democracy. Moreover, public participation within the datafied
society poses particular benefits and drawbacks given the complexities of
technological systems, their lack of transparency, and the compounding of
algorithmic harms on marginalized communities. Thus, to avoid the perils
of window dressing, models of public participation should be intentionally
crafted with clear goals in mind. To guide the development of these models,
Part III looks to public participation mandates and their impact on
marginalized communities in other legal regimes, including environmental
law, land use laws, and anti-poverty programs. This part reflects on the
effectiveness of these mandates for enhancing democracy for marginalized
communities and suggests lessons for drafters of public participation
requirements within algorithmic governance regimes.
I. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION FOR ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY
Computer scientists frame concerns and evaluate solutions for algorithmic
systems through the values of fairness, transparency, and accountability.28
Algorithmic impact assessments (AIAs) have emerged among policy makers,
academics, and advocates as a front-runner for incorporating these values
into technological regimes.29 AIAs generally involve an analysis of the
28. See Donghee Shin & Yong Jin Park, Role of Fairness, Accountability, and
Transparency in Algorithmic Affordance, 98 COMPUTS. HUM. BEHAV. 277, 277 (2019).
29. Requiring audits is another popular proposal for enhancing tech accountability,
although such proposals do not generally envision a strong role for the community. The term
“algorithmic audit” generally means “almost any kind of empirical study of algorithms.”
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proposed or existing societal impacts of an algorithmic system.30 AIAs hold
significant potential for enhancing public participation. However, the
mechanisms for engaging the public in the AIA process have not been fully
theorized or implemented. Nor has attention been paid to the particular needs
of marginalized people and the barriers they face in public participation
regimes.
Given that marginalized people are disproportionately
disadvantaged by algorithmic systems, this oversight risks reinforcing
algorithmic harms. Accordingly, this part surveys the landscape of proposed
and existing AIA mandates to identify how public participation is playing a
role in algorithmic accountability proposals. Overall, existing notions of
public participation within algorithmic accountability are modest or
undeveloped.31
A. Proposals for Public Participation
Numerous scholars, tech industry insiders, and civil society researchers
have proposed the adoption of AIAs, and in response, some state and local
jurisdictions have passed laws that include AIA-style requirements.32 They
aim to bring social values into technical systems and “to create and provide
documentation of the decisions made during development and their
rationales, which in turn can lead to better accountability for those decisions
and useful information for future policy interventions.”33 Conceptually,
AIAs are modeled after environmental impact assessments, which are legally
required before any federal agency action impacting the environment is

BRIANA VECCHIONE, SOLON BAROCAS & KAREN LEVY, ALGORITHMIC AUDITING AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE:
LESSONS FROM THE HISTORY OF AUDIT STUDIES 2 (2021),
https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3465416.3483294
[https://perma.cc/UBX5-PE5L]
(exploring the different goals of audits and possibilities for community engagement); see also
Khari Johnson, The Movement to Hold AI Accountable Gains More Steam, WIRED (Dec. 2,
2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/movement-hold-ai-accountable-gains-steam/
[https://perma.cc/E3JN-UNBD] (discussing proposals for AIAs, as well as auditing
requirements); ADA LOVELACE INST., EXAMINING THE BLACK BOX: TOOLS FOR ASSESSING
ALGORITHMIC SYSTEMS (2020), https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/
2020/04/Ada-Lovelace-Institute-DataKind-UK-Examining-the-Black-Box-Report-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/93RJ-WZNJ] (describing the differences between algorithmic audits and
impact assessments). AI registers are another experimental mechanism for enhancing
transparency; they are public lists of government-adopted algorithmic systems. See Luciano
Floridi, Artificial Intelligence as a Public Service: Learning from Amsterdam and Helsinki,
33 PHIL. & TECH. 541 (2020) (describing the first two cities to adopt open-AI registers).
30. See Andrew D. Selbst, An Institutional View of Algorithmic Impact Assessments, 35
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 117, 127 (2021) (“An Algorithmic Impact Assessment is a process in
which the developer of an algorithmic system aims to anticipate, test, and investigate potential
harms of the system before implementation; document those findings; and then either
publicize them or report them to a regulator.”).
31. See id. at 160 (“Though many of the specific AIA proposals envision input from
affected communities, none of the proposals has much detail or a workable vision for how to
accomplish it.”). Professor Andrew D. Selbst notes that while many developers focus on
testing the user experience, this does not engage with the people “who are subject to decisions
that the systems are used for.” Id. at 184.
32. Id. at 122–23.
33. Id. at 122.
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undertaken.34 AIAs also share lineage with impact assessments in other areas
such as the human rights and privacy practices of government agencies.35
AIA proposals vary widely in their details.36 For instance, an AIA can be
undertaken at multiple points during an algorithmic system’s life cycle—
before an automated decision-making system is deployed, during its
operation, or at all phases.37 Some AIA models apply only to government
agencies, others focus on private entities, and some cover both.38 Some rely
on voluntary compliance, while others are legally mandated.39
Another point of difference is the extent to which public disclosure and
participation are folded into the assessment process. Academic proposals
borrow heavily from the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) model,
although those proposals have not emphasized public participation to the
same extent that environmental law requires it.40 Professor Andrew Selbst
is the leading theorist on the ways in which AIAs can enhance algorithmic
decision-making and goes the furthest in envisioning a role for the public.
He explains the value of the AIA process:
Given the information disparities between developers on the one hand, and
policymakers and the public on the other, regulation that can slow down
the development process, create pathways for public input, and push
information out to the public can be an important step toward both
mitigating current harms and developing better, more concrete regulation
in the future.41

With regard to the public sphere, he recommends mandatory “algorithmic
impact statements” for police departments that adopt predictive policing
34. Id. at 127. Environmental impact assessments are discussed at length infra Part III.A.
35. Selbst, supra note 30, at 122.
36. See EMANUEL MOSS, ELIZABETH ANNE WATKINS, RANJIT SINGH, MADELEINE CLARE
ELISH & JACOB METCALF, DATA & SOC’Y, ASSEMBLING ACCOUNTABILITY: ALGORITHMIC
IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2020), https://datasociety.net/wpcontent/uploads/2021/06/Assembling-Accountability.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S75G-PD9U].
This report lists ten constitutive components that can vary widely but are generally shared by
algorithmic assessments. Id.
37. ADA LOVELACE INST., supra note 29, at 5.
38. Id. at 18.
39. MOSS ET AL., supra note 36, at 51.
40. Professor Sonia Katyal proposes to reduce algorithmic bias and discrimination in
private automated systems through “human impact statements,” which would “create a
framework for awareness” of “how big data can impact certain groups,” but she does not offer
mechanisms for public input in her proposal. Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the
Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54, 115, 117 (2019) (“The advantage of
employing a rigorous system of impact statements stems from enlisting engineers to explain
their design choices, evaluate their efficacy, include alternative configurations, and consider
whether any disparate impact has been created for a subpopulation.”). Similarly, Professor A.
Michael Froomkin suggests regulating mass surveillance in public and virtual spaces through
“privacy impact notices” that would assess “the broader societal impacts of surveillance on
society” as a way to encourage “greater incentives to build in privacy protections.” A. Michael
Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning from Environmental
Impact Statements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1747, 1752. He does not, however, describe
the public’s role in this process beyond suggesting that the EIS process for public comment
would be mirrored in his proposal.
41. Selbst, supra note 30, at 125.
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technologies; these tools use data mining techniques to predict crime and
raise serious risks of producing racist outcomes.42 Selbst states that public
comment is an “incredibly important part” of his proposal that is not “a
panacea,” but that would surface issues around fairness and public values.43
With regard to the private sphere, Selbst explains how AIAs can shine a light
on algorithmic harms, which are mostly “unknown and hard-to-measure.”44
Still, AIAs can raise concerns of self-interest and bias because they are
implemented by the same firms that they seek to regulate.45 Thus, he
explores the institutional dynamics within organizations, concluding that the
most realistic outcome of the AIA process will be “produc[ing] information
needed for better policy and public understanding.”46 He acknowledges the
hurdles to involving the community in a meaningful way,47 noting that
existing scholarship is “unsatisfying” and calling for greater engagement and
consideration on these issues.48
For their part, civil society groups have articulated a robust role for public
input in algorithmic systems. In 2018, the AI Now Institute proposed an
influential, albeit unadopted, algorithmic impact assessment process for New
York City public agencies that adopt automated decision systems.49 AI Now
described the myriad of algorithmic systems used by the city, ranging from
predictive policing to optimizing energy use to evaluating public school
teachers. The AI Now framework for AIAs is designed “to support affected
communities and stakeholders as they seek to assess the claims made about
these systems.”50 It intentionally involves “a wide range of individuals,
communities, researchers, and policymakers to participate in accountability
efforts.”51 Under the proposal, once an agency discloses that it will adopt an
automated decision system, there is a period for public comment, as well as
a subsequent opportunity for the public to challenge noncompliant agencies.
AI Now calls on public agencies to “proactively engage affected
communities to ensure that a system meets a given community’s goals”52 in
order to accurately assess cultural and social harms.53
Researchers at Data & Society have examined impact assessments in a
variety of regimes to identify their constitutive components, pinpoint the
conditions under which they succeed or fail, and suggest a menu of options
for policy makers in crafting AIA mandates. They find that public
consultation can be a “hollow requirement” if it lacks goals beyond “mere
42. Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109, 115,
118 (2017).
43. Id. at 178.
44. Selbst, supra note 30, at 123.
45. Id. at 124.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 160–61.
48. Id. at 160.
49. See generally REISMAN ET AL., supra note 9.
50. Id. at 4.
51. Id. at 7.
52. Id. at 15.
53. Id. at 18.
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notification.”54 Further, vulnerable individuals and communities may lack
knowledge of the harms they face from algorithmic systems, the remedy for
which requires education, outreach, and engagement efforts, as well as
compensation for time expended.55 The Data & Society criteria for building
an AIA are attentive to the power imbalances implicated in public
participation processes. These civil-society visions for meaningful public
input are largely missing in existing and proposed regulatory reforms.
B. Algorithmic Impact Assessments in Law
How have these ideas been translated into the real world? This section
describes proposed bills and enacted laws that require AIA-type processes,
starting with the most broadly applicable law on a jurisdictional basis and
ending with the narrowest.56 Overall, robust public participation rights
remain elusive, other than in the context of a handful of municipal statutes
governing surveillance.
In the European Union, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
in effect since 2018, governs the collection and flow of personal data for EU
residents.57 The GDPR places multiple obligations on the entities that gather,
hold, and use personal data (called “data controllers”), while also granting
consumers (called “data subjects”) certain qualified rights to control their
personal information.58 The GDPR requires some level of public
participation through Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs), which
are reports that data controllers must prepare whenever automated
processing, particularly using new technologies, “is likely to result in a high
risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.”59 A DPIA must contain
a description of the intended processing and its purposes, the necessity and
proportionality of the processing, the risks to the rights and freedoms of data

54. MOSS ET AL., supra note 36, at 21.
55. See generally id.
56. For a list of algorithmic accountability tools used in the public sector, see ADA
LOVELACE INST., AI NOW INST. & OPEN GOV’T P’SHIP, ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR THE PUBLIC SECTOR 9 (2021), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/
2021/08/algorithmic-accountability-public-sector.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VF5-552H].
In
reviewing these AIA mechanisms, the authors conclude that “[m]ost of the AIA mechanisms
reviewed do not establish clear processes for public participation, for ensuring transparency
or public access to the outcomes, or clear lines of accountability linking back to the use of
algorithmic systems by public agencies.” Id. at 23.
57. Regulation 2016/679, General Data Protection Regulation, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU).
58. Id. art. 4(7), (1). “Personal data” is defined as “any information relating to an
identified or identifiable natural person.” Id. art. 4(1). For instance, under the GDPR, data
subjects have rights to request an explanation for algorithmic outputs, to erase certain personal
data from online databases, and to withdraw their consent from data processing. Id. art.
15(1)(h) (right to explanation); id. art. 17 (right to be forgotten); id. arts. 7(3), 21 (right to
withdraw consent).
59. Id. art. 35. High-risk situations include profiling that has significant effects,
processing of sensitive categories of personal data (including criminal convictions), and
large-scale monitoring of public areas. Id.
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subjects, and the steps and safeguards the controller is taking to protect
personal data.60
Data subjects have a role in the DPIA process, albeit one that remains
undefined: “Where appropriate, the controller shall seek the views of data
subjects or their representatives on the intended processing . . . .”61 The
Article 29 Working Party, an advisory body that interprets the GDPR, has
further elaborated on DPIAs through a set of guidelines.62 The guidelines
suggest that controllers can obtain public views through a variety of means,
including “survey[s] sent to the data controller’s future customers,”63 as well
as through expert consultations with lawyers, IT experts, sociologists, and
ethicists.64 DPIAs are not required to be made public, although the
guidelines recommend it,65 and DPIAs are not automatically reviewed by any
government authority. Accordingly, they have been critiqued for failing to
require adequate public input or disclosure. To strengthen the accountability
mechanisms of DPIAs, Professors Margot Kaminski and Gianclaudio
Malgieri urge for the adoption of stronger requirements for public input,
advocating that DPIAs should “better involve and engage impacted
individuals, not just through surveys but through representative boards.”66
They also encourage “companies, or regulators, to help fund the
involvement” of impacted individuals and to “provide technical expertise or
the resources for obtaining technical expertise.”67
In an approach that differs from the European Union’s with the GDPR,
Canada has adopted a scored model of algorithmic accountability. Since
April 2020, a Directive on Automated Decision-Making has required
Canadian federal government agencies to perform algorithmic impact
assessments.68 The assessments consist of a rubric of sixty questions that
aim to assess the risks of an automated system based on factors such as
individual rights, well-being, and economic interests.69 Critics of the
60. Id. art. 35(7)(a)–(d).
61. Id. art. 35(9).
62. EUROPEAN COMM’N, GUIDELINES ON DATA PROTECTION IMPACT ASSESSMENT (DPIA)
AND DETERMINING WHETHER PROCESSING IS “LIKELY TO RESULT IN A HIGH RISK” FOR THE
PURPOSES OF REGULATION 2016/679, at 13 (2017), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/
items/611236 [https://perma.cc/4CXW-5M6L] (click on link).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 14.
65. Id. at 17.
66. Kaminski & Malgieri, supra note 9, at 139.
67. Id. Kaminski and Malgieri highlight the ways in which DPIAs function as a bridge
between the GDPR’s individual-rights framework and its cooperative, public/private
governance system. The DPIA tasks companies with engaging in a “form of monitored
self-regulation” that “consider[s] risks of unfairness, error, bias, and discrimination, and . . .
com[es] up with concrete ways of mitigating those risks.” Id. at 131.
68. Algorithmic Impact Assessment Tool, GOV’T OF CAN. (Apr. 19, 2022),
https://www.canada.ca/en/government/system/digital-government/digital-governmentinnovations/responsible-use-ai/algorithmic-impact-assessment.html [https://perma.cc/8VVA2F9K].
69. Id. Depending on the score, the system is sorted into a tier of highest to lowest risk,
and additional accountability requirements—such as peer review, public notice, and human
involvement in decision-making—hinge on these scores. Id.
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Canadian system note that a scored, yes/no rubric is a particularly shallow
form of accountability because it does not require an accounting of the
workings of the automated decision system, a description of the epistemic
practices and metrics used, or even details on how such systems are
assembled.70 Furthermore, public input has no role in the assessment.
The United States has not yet enacted a comprehensive algorithmic
accountability or data privacy law. In 2022, a proposed federal privacy law
called the American Data Privacy and Protection Act71 (ADPPA) made it
further along in the legislative process than any of its many predecessors,
clearing the House Committee on Energy and Commerce by a vote of
53–2.72 Its chances of passage by the full Congress are mixed,73 but even if
it fails to move forward in 2022, it is the result of intense bipartisan
negotiations and thus the likely template for any future bills. In its current
form, the ADPPA requires large companies to conduct annual algorithm
impact assessments that describe the purpose and design process for their
algorithms, the data inputs and proposed outputs, and the steps the company
has taken to mitigate potential harms, including injuries to civil rights.74 In
conducting the assessments, companies must use external, independent
auditors or researchers and submit the assessments to the Federal Trade
Commission, with an option to make a summary publicly available.75 Large
companies are also required to conduct biennial, written privacy impact
assessments weighing the benefits of data processing against the potential
adverse consequences to individual privacy interests.76 Further, regardless
of size, all companies that process covered data are required to proactively
evaluate the risks of their automated decision-making systems.77 Notably,
however, the ADPPA does not require—or even mention—a role for public
consultation in any of these assessments or evaluations.78

70. MOSS ET AL., supra note 36, at 32; see also Selbst, supra note 30, at 148 (“While the
questions that the Canadian AIA asks are thoughtful, they are fixed and quite general.”).
71. American Data Privacy and Protection Act, H.R. 8152, 117th Cong. (2022).
72. In general, the bill requires covered entities to minimize the amount of data they
collect, provides consumers with a series of rights to control the collection and use of their
data, and bans targeted advertising to children and to any persons who opt out. Id. §§ 101,
201–210. It bolsters civil rights by forbidding the use of covered data in a manner that
discriminates on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, or disability. Id.
§ 207(a). It compromises on two long-standing political sticking points—allowing federal
preemption of most state laws (favored by Republicans), as well as a private right of action to
enforce its provisions (favored by Democrats). Id. §§ 204(b), 403(a).
73. See Cristiano Lima, Top Senate Democrat Casts Doubt on Prospect of Major Data
Privacy Bill, WASH. POST (June 22, 2022, 2:15 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2022/06/22/privacy-bill-maria-cantwell-congress/ [https://perma.cc/JEL9-Z6BP]
(discussing objections from Democratic senators concerned about the bill’s preemption
provisions).
74. H.R. 8152 § 207(c).
75. Id.
76. Id. § 301(d).
77. Id. § 207(c)(2).
78. It is possible that such requirements would be set forth in implementing regulations
issued by the Federal Trade Commission. Id. § 207(c)(5).
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Given that the United States continues to lack a comprehensive data
privacy law, some states are moving to fill the gap. The first comprehensive
data privacy law among the states was the California Consumer Privacy
Act79 (CCPA), which went into effect in January 2020.80 It gives consumers
certain rights to control the personal data that businesses collect about them,
including a right to know what information is collected and how it is used.
The CCPA requires the California attorney general to solicit public opinion
in crafting regulations (a regular feature of administrative rulemaking), 81 but
it does not appear to require ongoing public participation in monitoring the
law’s implementation as does the GDPR, as it does not require any sort of
impact assessment.82 However, in January 2023, the California Privacy
Rights Act83 (CPRA) will fully supplant the CCPA.84 The CPRA mandates
regular risk assessments for processing activities that present “significant
risk” to consumers.85 The assessment must indicate whether data processing
involves sensitive personal information, and it must identify and weigh the
benefits resulting from data processing against the potential risks to
consumers.86 The CPRA does not expressly mention public participation in
connection with the assessment process, although the public will have
opportunities to comment on implementing regulations and, in turn, those
regulations might require some form of public consultation.87
In addition to California, four states—Colorado, Connecticut, Utah, and
Virginia—have passed their own privacy laws; all except Utah require some
form of risk assessment.88 For example, Virginia’s privacy law foresees a
different role for the public than the CCPA does, but like the CCPA, it is
similarly constrained. In 2021, Virginia became the second state to adopt a
comprehensive privacy law; it blends certain aspects of the CCPA and
GDPR, giving consumers a right to access, correct, and delete their personal
information held by businesses. Like the GDPR, Virginia’s Consumer Data
Protection Act89 requires businesses to conduct “data protection
assessments” when processing personal data in a way that poses risks to
79. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199.100 (West 2021).
80. Id. § 1798.198(a).
81. Id. § 1798.185(a).
82. “The Attorney General’s Office held seven public forums around the state and
received over 300 written comments during its preliminary rulemaking activities regarding the
CCPA.” California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) Preliminary Rulemaking Activities, ST. OF
CAL. DEP’T. OF J., https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa/prelim [https://perma.cc/2Z9C-BB7K] (last
visited Oct. 7, 2022).
83. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199.100 (West 2022) (effective Jan. 1, 2023).
84. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), CPPA, https://cppa.ca.gov/faq.html
[https://perma.cc/C2FA-JE7N] (click on “What is the California Consumer Privacy Act?”).
85. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.185(a)(15).
86. Id.
87. California Consumer Privacy Act Regulations, CPPA, https://cppa.ca.gov/
regulations/consumer_privacy_act.html [https://perma.cc/JF3M-7CHG] (last visited Oct. 7,
2022).
88. See Taylor Kay Lively, US State Privacy Legislation Tracker, IAPP,
https://iapp.org/resources/article/us-state-privacy-legislation-tracker/ [https://perma.cc/J9V65CM4] (Aug. 11, 2022).
89. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-575 to 59.1-585 (2022) (effective Jan. 1, 2023).
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consumers.90 However, the act envisions no role for public input; to the
contrary, the assessments are considered confidential, privileged, and exempt
from freedom of information laws.91 Only the state attorney general has the
right to review them.92 Outside input is envisioned only with regard to a
statutorily required, temporary work group charged with reviewing the act
and considering implementation issues; members of the work group include
businesses, government officials, and consumer rights advocates. It does not
envision participation by members of the general public.93
Yet another approach for public input was adopted by Washington State
when it passed a facial recognition privacy bill in 2020, prohibiting the
deployment of FRT without “meaningful human review” of its outputs and
requiring employee training on the technology’s limitations.94 The act
requires public notice before a government agency uses facial recognition
technology.95 It requires at least three community meetings and a published
report outlining the technology’s potential impact on civil liberties before an
FRT is approved.96 However, as the ACLU has critiqued, the accountability
reports do not require any regulatory approval, and agency compliance is
unenforceable.97
Perhaps the strongest version of public participation to date is contained in
City of Seattle Ordinance 125679,98 which is part of a wave of at least sixteen
local laws enacted since 2015 to govern the adoption of surveillance
technologies at the local level.99 These laws have been spurred by the
confluence of racial justice concerns about over-policing of minority
communities and revelations of secret government surveillance programs.100
Minority communities in particular are heavily surveilled, and as a result,
residents’ data become embedded in government databases that feed
predictive policing algorithms used by law enforcement to identify “hot
spots” for increased patrolling.101 This creates a self-reinforcing feedback

90. Id. § 59.1-579.
91. Id. § 59.1-575.
92. Id.
93. Id. §§ 59.1-575 to 59.1-585.
94. S. 6280, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Jennifer Lee, We Need a Face Surveillance Moratorium, Not Weak Regulations:
Concerns About SB 6280, ACLU WASH. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.aclu-wa.org/story/weneed-face-surveillance-moratorium-not-weak-regulations-concerns-about-sb-6280
[https://perma.cc/K94S-KCS5].
98. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE §§ 14.18.010–14.18.070 (2022).
99. For an overview of local surveillance ordinances, see ARI CHIVUKULA & TYLER
TAKEMOTO, BERKELEY SCH. OF L., LOCAL SURVEILLANCE OVERSIGHT ORDINANCES (2021),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Local-Surveillance-OrdinancesWhite-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8JS-N8AF].
100. See Meg Young, Michael Katell & P.M. Krafft, Municipal Surveillance Regulation
and Algorithmic Accountability, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, July–Dec. 2019, at 1, 2.
101. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV.
1109, 1124, 1148–49 (2017).
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loop that “perpetuate[s] historical biases in enforcement.”102 In other words,
people are arrested because they have a history of arrests. Whereas the
federal and state governments have been slow to rein in law enforcement
surveillance tools, “the arrival of big data in the urban environment” has led
to privacy lawmaking at the local government level, a trend Ira Rubenstein
labels “privacy localism.”103
Seattle enacted its surveillance ordinance104 with the express goals of
mitigating civil liberties concerns and incorporating racial equity principles
in the adoption and use of surveillance technologies.105 The ordinance
contains several provisions for public input.106 Under the ordinance, each
city department must prepare a “surveillance technology determination list”
that publicly identifies all surveillance technologies that it is using or
considering adopting, as well as a surveillance impact report (SIR) for each
technology.107 The SIR must describe the technology, its planned or
foreseeable uses, its potential impacts on civil rights, the benefits to the
public from the technology’s adoption, and a description of public
engagement efforts—including public presentations, structured discussions,
and public feedback received.108 The ordinance specifically states that “[t]he
community meeting or meetings should be accessible, be noticed in
multiple languages, be held in communities impacted by the proposed
acquisition, and collect information about potential disparate impacts on
disadvantaged groups.”109
Following the drafting of the SIR, a “Community Surveillance Working
Group” is tasked with evaluating the SIR, along with any public comments,
then preparing a privacy and civil liberties impact assessment.110 Under the
ordinance, the working group must have at least five members from
“equity-focused organizations” that are focused on groups historically
subject to disproportionate surveillance.111 The surveillance technology
must also be approved by the city council112 and remains subject to an annual
equity impact assessment that considers public complaints or concerns.113
102. William Isaac & Kristian Lum, Setting the Record Straight on Predictive Policing and
Race, THE APPEAL (Jan. 3, 2018), https://theappeal.org/setting-the-record-straight-onpredictive-policing-and-race-fe588b457ca2/ [https://perma.cc/NM7Y-PGNT].
103. Ira Rubinstein, Privacy Localism, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1961, 1965–66 (2018).
104. For a history of police surveillance in Seattle, see Crump, supra note 9, at 1605–15.
105. The ordinance defines “surveillance technology” as “any electronic device, software
program, or hosted software solution that is designed or primarily intended to be used for the
purpose of surveillance,” subject to various exceptions. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 14.18.010 (2022).
106. The Seattle surveillance ordinance appears to be the most robust of all the municipal
statutes in terms of public participation, although Oakland, California, has a similar statute.
See Young et al., supra note 100, at 10.
107. MUN. CODE § 14.18.020.
108. Id. § 14.18.040.
109. Id. § 14.18.020(C).
110. Id. § 14.18.080(B)(1).
111. Id. § 14.18.080(A)(3).
112. Id. § 14.18.020(A).
113. Id. § 14.18.050(A).
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Moreover, steps for further review are required if a surveillance technology’s
functionality materially changes after its initial approval.114 While this
ordinance is narrowly tailored to surveillance technologies, it demonstrates
an understanding of the benefits and barriers that marginalized populations
face in engaging in public comment. Still, implementation of the ordinance
has not been without bumps. One barrier to public engagement is the length
of time to write the SIR—usually about six to seven months.115 Another is
the length of the completed SIRs; for instance, the SIR on the police
department’s use of automated license plate readers in patrol cars runs 349
pages long and can be too lengthy and complex to engage the general
public.116 Thus, implementing public participation in ways that are
meaningful and accessible is itself an ongoing process, even if a robust
statutory framework is in place.
C. Nonregulatory Approaches to Public Participation
Although this Article focuses on bringing public participation into
regulatory regimes, it is essential to acknowledge that citizens can and do
provide feedback on algorithmic systems through other routes, often with
more force and effect. Both technical design methods and protest movements
have brought increased transparency and accountability to certain automated
systems.
Participatory design is a technical, engineering method for enhancing
accountability in which technology designers collaborate with users in
developing automated systems.117 The philosophy is straightforward: “All
participatory methods recognize users as authorities over their own social
context and hold that active cooperation with designers can make meaningful
input or control possible.”118 The participatory design process brings user

114. Id. § 14.18.020(F).
115. Melissa Hellmann, Seattle’s Oversight of Surveillance Technology Is Moving
Forward Slowly, SEATTLE TIMES (June 4, 2019, 3:39 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/
business/technology/seattles-oversight-of-surveillance-technology-is-moving-forwardslowly/ [https://perma.cc/G2S6-WTKR]; Jennifer Lee & Shankar Narayan, Government
Surveillance Disproportionately Impacts Vulnerable Community Members, REAL CHANGE
NEWS (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.realchangenews.org/news/2019/09/25/governmentsurveillance-disproportionately-impacts-vulnerable-community-members [https://perma.cc/
K5Y8-SX3U].
116. See Young et al., supra note 100, at 6.
117. Michael Katell, Meg Young, Dharma Dailey, Bernease Herman, Vivian Guetler,
Aaron Tam, Corinne Bintz, Daniella Raz & P.M. Krafft, Toward Situated Interventions for
Algorithmic Equity: Lessons from the Field, 2020 PROC. CONF. ON FAIRNESS ACCOUNTABILITY
& TRANSPARENCY 45, 46. The field of participatory design includes “user-led innovation,
user-centered design (UCD), human-centered design (HCD), inclusive design, and codesign.”
SASHA COSTANZA-CHOCK, DESIGN JUSTICE: COMMUNITY-LED PRACTICES TO BUILD THE
WORLDS WE NEED 85 (2020); see also Madisson Whitman, Chien-yi Hsiang & Kendall Roark,
Potential for Participatory Big Data Ethics and Algorithm Design: A Scoping Mapping
Review, 2 PROC. 15TH PARTICIPATORY DESIGN CONF. 1 (2018).
118. Katell et al., supra note 117, at 46; see also Erling Björgvinsson, Pelle Ehn &
Per-Anders Hillgren, Design Things and Design Thinking: Contemporary Participatory
Design Challenges, DESIGN ISSUES, Summer 2012, at 101, 103 (“Participatory Design, seen as
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values into system design119 and can “combin[e] business-oriented and
socially sensitive perspectives.”120 Methods for participatory design vary
widely and can include design workshops, evaluation of mock-ups and
prototypes,121 and the “use of metaphors, design fiction, and futuristic
scenarios,”122 all with the goal of making “critiques and alternative visions
for sociotechnical systems more accessible.”123 Participatory design is not
required by law; rather, it is voluntary on the part of technology designers
and adopters whose incentives include creating superior products that are
more likely to gain public acceptance.
Relatedly, the design justice movement is an explicitly political vision of
participatory design with commitments to dismantling “the ways that design
reproduces and/or challenges the matrix of domination (white supremacy,
heteropatriarchy, capitalism, ableism, settler colonialism, and other forms of
structural inequality).”124 It consists of design practitioners working in
collaboration with social movements and community-based organizations, in
recognition that “[d]esign mediates so much of our realities and has
tremendous impact on our lives, yet very few of us participate in design
processes.”125 Whereas standard participatory design practitioners may
value user input, it “has sometimes (at worst) been reduced to an extractive
process to gather new product ideas.”126
Accordingly, as Sasha
Constanza-Chock explains, “the most valuable ingredient in design justice is
the full inclusion of, accountability to, and control by people with direct lived
experience of the conditions designers claim they are trying to change.”127
Practitioners of design justice are organized around a set of core principles,
including recognizing “the role of the designer as a facilitator rather than an
expert” and considering all community members as experts “based on their
own lived experience.”128
With its defiance of conventional design norms, design justice shares
commitments with social and labor protest movements for tech
accountability.
Professor Hannah Bloch-Wehba categorizes these
movements as the “democratic vision” for AI, where ordinary people
design of Things, has its roots in the movements toward democratization of work places in the
Scandinavian countries.”).
119. Min Kyung Lee, Daniel Kusbit, Anson Kahng, Ji Tae Kim, Xinran Yuan, Allissa
Chan, Daniel See, Ritesh Noothigattu, Siheon Lee, Alexandros Psomas & Ariel D. Procaccia,
WeBuildAI: Participatory Framework for Fair and Efficient Algorithmic Governance,
3 PROC. ACM ON HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTION 1, 1 (2019).
120. Jesper Simonsen & Morten Hertzum, Sustained Participatory Design: Extending the
Iterative Approach, DESIGN ISSUES, Summer 2012, at 10, 10.
121. Toni Robertson & Jesper Simonsen, Challenges and Opportunities in Contemporary
Participatory Design, DESIGN ISSUES, Summer 2012, at 3, 3.
122. Katell et al., supra note 117, at 46.
123. See id.
124. COSTANZA-CHOCK, supra note 117, at 23.
125. Id. at 6 (quoting principles of the Design Justice Network).
126. Id. at 87.
127. Id. at 25.
128. Design Justice Network Principles, DESIGN JUST. NETWORK, https://designjustice.org/
read-the-principles [https://perma.cc/88Z3-WBL9] (last visited Oct. 7, 2022).
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challenge the ways in which governments are partnering with private actors
to supply new technologies for use in the criminal, immigration, and national
security legal systems.129 The actions by the tenants of Atlantic Plaza
Towers, discussed earlier, constitute a perfect example of this organizing and
activism.130 Unlike more technocratic approaches to AI accountability, such
as AIAs and audits, the democratic vision is powered by tech workers,
immigrant rights activists, police abolitionists, and community-based
organizers who are “demand[ing] democratic participation and control of the
mechanisms of governance.”131 For instance, Bloch-Wehba highlights local
activists organizing against police use of facial recognition technology in
cities across the United States, who were joined by tech workers at Amazon
who opposed FRT’s role in surveilling Black Americans.132 This ultimately
resulted in Amazon putting a yearlong moratorium on FRT sales to police,
followed by similar announcements from IBM and Microsoft.133 Further, in
response to civic organizing, some cities have moved to ban FRT outright,
rather than simply moving to improve its accuracy or narrow its scope.134
Nantina Vgontzas and Meredith Whittaker spotlight the broad worker and
activist coalitions advancing the progressive tech agenda, urging that “if we
don’t vie for control over the algorithms, data, and infrastructure that are
shaping our lives, we face a grim future.”135
There are countless examples of tech resistance,136 including housing
activists using open data to track landlords pursuing wrongful evictions,137
worker coalitions advocating to enact fair-workweek laws to counter
algorithmic scheduling systems that destabilize workers’ lives,138 student
protests against the surveillance of online proctoring,139 and citizens

129. See Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Algorithmic Governance from the Bottom Up, BYU
L. REV. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4054640
[https://perma.cc/PS87-AG9S].
130. See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text.
131. See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 129 (manuscript at 9).
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. See Jameson Spivack & Clare Garvie, A Taxonomy of Legislative Approaches to Face
Recognition in the United States, in REGULATING BIOMETRICS: GLOBAL APPROACHES AND
URGENT QUESTIONS 86, 90 (Amba Kak ed., 2020).
135. Nantina Vgontzas & Meredith Whittaker, These Machines Won’t Kill Fascism:
Toward a Militant Progressive Vision for Tech, NATION (Jan. 29, 2021),
https://www.thenation.com/article/society/tech-labor-progressive/ [https://perma.cc/45TKHHB7].
136. Professor Scott Skinner-Thompson has written about the ways in which individuals
“perform privacy” as a form of resistance against surveillance, such as by using technology to
frustrate facial recognition software by wearing masks or even a hoodie. SCOTT
SKINNER-THOMPSON, PRIVACY AT THE MARGINS 45–51 (2021).
137. ANTI-EVICTION MAPPING PROJECT, https://antievictionmap.com/ [https://perma.cc/
DK8B-VME5] (last visited Oct. 7, 2022).
138. JULIA WOLFE, JANELLE JONES & DAVID COOPER, ECON. POL’Y INST., “FAIR
WORKWEEK” LAWS HELP MORE THAN 1.8 MILLION WORKERS (2018),
https://files.epi.org/pdf/145586.pdf [https://perma.cc/X54W-ABEK].
139. Jeffrey R. Young, Pushback Is Growing Against Automated Proctoring Services. But
So Is Their Use, EDSURGE (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.edsurge.com/news/2020-11-13-
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protesting “smart city” technologies.140 Even when these campaigns do not
achieve their goals, they bring much needed awareness of problematic tech
practices, which can lay the groundwork for substantive reforms down the
road.141
While regulatory, technical, and resistance approaches to
algorithmic accountability provide different modes of public input, they can
coexist and strengthen each other. The truth is that complementary, iterative,
and ongoing modes for civic participation are necessary to effectuate change
for historically disempowered people.142 One advantage of a regulatory
approach is that it is mandated, ensuring public input regardless of whether
there are grassroots organizing efforts or voluntary corporate initiatives.
Given the lack of transparency surrounding many algorithmic systems, a
regulatory requirement is important for fostering accountability. The
downside to a regulatory approach is that it may not be as flexible and
dynamic as these other modes, and, as experience demonstrates, it is less
likely to challenge or disrupt existing power structures that can oppress
marginalized people. That is the core challenge of the regulatory approach
to public participation.
II. THEORIZING PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Before examining public participation mandates in other legal regimes, it
is worth considering why citizen engagement for algorithmic accountability
matters in the first place. After all, the United States has a representative
democracy in which elected officials enact laws, and accountability
presumably flows from the electoral process.143 For theorists of minimal
democracy, this is more than adequate.144 And this is a fair description of
how data privacy and algorithmic accountability laws are currently shaped,
i.e., through political action, or more to the point, inaction. There are very
few mechanisms for public input on the technology that governs our lives
and very little evidence to suggest that technology concerns are driving
electoral contests in today’s highly polarized political environment.
Nevertheless, the United States has a rich history of public participation
pushback-is-growing-against-automated-proctoring-services-but-so-is-their-use
[https://perma.cc/RFH5-NSRW].
140. Nabeel Ahmed, The City vs. Big Tech, BRIARPATCH (July 2, 2019),
https://briarpatchmagazine.com/articles/view/the-city-vs.-big-tech [https://perma.cc/VN5LEZZ6].
141. See Selbst, supra note 30, at 124.
142. See Jaime Alison Lee, Turning Participation into Power: A Water Justice Case Study,
28 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1003, 1043–44 (2021) (“It may well be that contestatory power and
participatory power are both necessary to achieve change.”).
143. See Reeve T. Bull, Making the Administrative State “Safe for Democracy”:
A Theoretical and Practical Analysis of Citizen Participation in Agency Decisionmaking, 65
ADMIN. L. REV. 611, 624 (2013) (chronicling the roots of democracy from ancient Greece to
the present); Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 531, 558–59 (1998) (“The Constitution’s answer, arrived at with much difficulty and
contest, was that the people would stand apart from their representatives and would enforce
the terms of their delegation of power to the government. The people’s power would be given
away, but reclaimed in an oversight role on election day.”).
144. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269, 284–85 (1943).
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beyond the ballot box.145 Public participation is “anchored by the democratic
values of political equality and popular sovereignty which are thrust upon the
republican form of government.”146 Benjamin Barber stressed the goal of
“self-government by citizens rather than representative government in the
name of citizens.”147 This part examines the benefits and barriers to
meaningful public participation, particularly within the datafied society, and
situates these conflicts within the major political theory frameworks for
citizen engagement.
A. Benefits
For its proponents, the benefits of public participation are both societal and
individual. At a societal level, public participation is said to enhance the
quality of decision-making by including the perspectives of people most
impacted by any given policy, who can provide needed information and
novel problem-solving ideas.148 In turn, this leads to improved outcomes. It
also ensures the inclusion of a range of social and cultural values, which can
expand decision-making outside of narrow technical and scientific
parameters.149 In addition, public participation adds democratic legitimacy
to governmental decisions because people gain trust from processes they
understand and impact.150 It improves accountability by adding layers of
scrutiny and discussion between the public and their elected officials.
Professor Archon Fung highlights the social justice value of participatory
governance when it shifts “power to those who are socially and politically
marginalized,” although this goal can be elusive.151 At an individual level,
public participation is touted for enhancing civic skills, which in turn enhance
people’s dignity and self-respect.152
These arguments are particularly salient with regard to data-centric
technologies. To begin, representative democracy is not currently aligned
with the people’s will when it comes to data privacy. Ample public surveys
show a disconnect between people’s reported concerns about data privacy—
145. See Audrey McFarlane, When Inclusion Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted Terrain
of Community Participation in Economic Development, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 908 (2000).
146. RAJENDRA RAMLOGAN, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS A JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION 165 (2011); see also Archon Fung, Varieties of Participation in Complex
Governance, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66 (2006) (discussing the democratic governance
justification for public participation); Barbara L. Bezdek, Citizen Engagement in the Shrinking
City: Toward Development Justice in an Era of Growing Inequality, 33 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 3, 9 (2014).
147. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW
AGE 151 (2004). In this republished version of his 1984 book, Barber raised technological
threats to democracy and the ways in which they tend to “mirror and reinforce rather than
transform the societies in which they emerge.” Id. at xv.
148. Roberts, supra note 11, at 324; Innes & Booher, supra note 11, at 426, 428–29.
149. THOMAS C. BEIERLE & JERRY CAYFORD, DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 14 (2002).
150. See Roberts, supra note 11, at 323.
151. See Fung, supra note 15, at 519–20.
152. See Roberts, supra note 11, at 323; Angela M. Gius, Dignifying Participation, 42
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 45, 61–62 (2018); McFarlane, supra note 145, at 911.
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58 percent of survey respondents consider the threat to their online privacy
as a crisis153—and the lack of regulation. In the United States, there is
currently no comprehensive data privacy or algorithmic accountability law
in place; rather, our privacy protections are scattered and sectoral, with wide
gaps that leave people’s data exposed for commercial and governmental uses
and abuses.154 The pluralist model of democracy contends that interest group
bargaining is an adequate proxy for the public will,155 but this does not appear
to hold true for digital privacy—likely due to the dominance of big tech
companies in political donations and lobbying power.156 At the same time,
legislators have proved woefully uninformed about technology and are easily
swayed by the innovation rhetoric of “Big Tech.”157 Thus, when it comes to
the age of algorithms, the ballot box alone is not adequate to ensure that
democratic values inform technology development.
Further, citizens are participating unwittingly in big-data networks without
knowing the extent to which their data is used or for what purposes, while
businesses reap massive profits from their data, and governments use data for
social control. As one international privacy advocacy group reports:
Most consumers still think about online privacy as being primarily
concerned with the data they share, and not the data that is observed from
their behaviour, inferred or predicted. It is our experience that the general
understanding of how profiling works and the kinds of information it can
reveal is exceptionally low.158

153. Kim Hart, A Growing Majority Now Views Our Online Privacy as a Crisis, AXIOS
(Mar. 9, 2019), https://www.axios.com/a-growing-majority-now-views-our-online-privacyas-a-crisis-1552080369-94146f05-332d-465d-a136-4414f9cdf9ce.html
[https://perma.cc/NPQ9-B9Q3]. In a November 2019 report, the Pew Research Center found
that over 60 percent of American adults polled do not think that they can go through daily life
without having their data collected. BROOKE AUXIER, LEE RAINIE, MONICA ANDERSON,
ANDREW PERRIN, MADHU KUMAR & ERICA TURNER, PEW RSCH. CTR., AMERICANS AND
PRIVACY: CONCERNED, CONFUSED AND FEELING LACK OF CONTROL OVER THEIR PERSONAL
INFORMATION 30 (2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-andprivacy-concerned-confused-and-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information/
[https://perma.cc/N728-XLWP] (click on “Complete Report PDF”). Eighty-one percent of
respondents believe that the risks of private data collection outweigh the benefits, and 66
percent believe that the risks of government data collection outweigh the benefits. Id.
Relatedly, large majorities are concerned about how their data is used by companies (79
percent) and the government (64 percent). Id. Seventy-nine percent have no faith that
companies will admit mistakes or take responsibility for data misuse and breaches. Id.
Reflecting these concerns, 75 percent opine that there should be more privacy regulation. Id.
154. See Gilman, supra note 20, at 402.
155. See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN
AMERICAN CITY (2d ed. 1961).
156. See Cecilia Kang & Kenneth P. Vogel, Tech Giants Amass a Lobbying Army for an
Epic Washington Battle, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/us/
politics/amazon-apple-facebook-google-lobbying.html [https://perma.cc/U99W-G36E].
157. Overall, “members of Congress lack technical expertise and face a paucity of trusted,
non-ideological, and credible external technical experts.” Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A.
Bamberger, Saving Governance-By-Design, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 697, 702 (2018).
158. PRIV. INT’L, DATA IS POWER: PROFILING AND AUTOMATED DECISION-MAKING IN
GDPR 12 (2017), https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2018-04/Data%20Is%
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Citizens are subjects of technology, yet they have little self-determination
or voice in the vast algorithmic networks that shape their lives. Professor
Ngozi Okidegbe calls this a form of “democratic exclusion”159 that reinforces
existing patterns of political exclusion.160 A democratic corrective to this
dynamic is arguably all the more urgent, given how the online environment
is corrupting democracy through disinformation campaigns that target people
based on their digital profiles in order to sway elections and sow discontent
and division.161
Moreover, privacy is a collective value necessary for the realization of
democracy, and thus public participation in framing and enforcing privacy
rights can enhance the overall democratic project.162 As Professor Carissa
Véliz explains, a single person’s data disclosure, whether voluntary or
unknowing, puts the rest of society at risk because our data is interlinked.163
Professor Darakhshan Mir elaborates that individuals’ personal data “are
interlinked with each other in underlying social contexts animated by the
social, communal, professional, civic, and commercial links they have with
other individuals, entities, and institutions.”164 This collective nature of
privacy has consequences for democracy. Privacy allows “us to vote
according to our beliefs and without undue pressure, for us to protest
anonymously without fear of repercussions, to have freedom to associate,
speak our minds, read what we are curious about.”165 And yet, a culture of
data extraction negates privacy and shifts power from the people to private
companies and the state.166 Professor Julie Cohen explains that “citizens
who are subject to pervasively distributed surveillance and modulation by
powerful commercial and political interests . . . increasingly will lack the
ability to form and pursue meaningful agendas for human flourishing.”167
20Power-Profiling%20and%20Automated%20Decision-Making%20in%20GDPR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2PR5-5FK2].
159. Okidegbe, supra note 16, at 757 (discussing pretrial algorithms used to determine bail
in the criminal law system).
160. Id. at 761.
161. See CARISSA VÉLIZ, PRIVACY IS POWER 80–81 (2021); Joan Donovan, Deconstructing
Disinformation’s Threat to Democracy, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFFS., Winter 2020, at 153, 153.
162. Darakhshan J. Mir, Designing for the Privacy Commons, in GOVERNING PRIVACY IN
KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 245 (Madelyn Rose Sanfilippo, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J.
Strandburg eds., 2021); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND.
L. REV. 1609, 1613–14 (1999) (“[I]nformation privacy is best conceived of as a constitutive
element of civil society. The Internet’s potential to improve shared life in the United States
will be squandered unless we structure the kinds of information use necessary for democratic
community and individual self-governance.”); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1905 (2013) (“Privacy therefore is an indispensable structural feature of
liberal democratic political systems.”); VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW
HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 12 (2018) (“The widespread use
of these [algorithmic] systems impacts the quality of democracy for us all.”).
163. VÉLIZ, supra note 161, at 80–81.
164. See Mir, supra note 162, at 248.
165. VÉLIZ, supra note 161, at 87; see also SKINNER-THOMPSON, supra note 136, at 50–54
(explaining how privacy enables First Amendment rights to speech and association, both of
which are essential to a functioning democracy).
166. VÉLIZ, supra note 161, at 87.
167. Cohen, supra note 162, at 1912.
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The collective and democratic values of privacy lend “credence to the idea
of using democratic processes to determine which norms or rules regarding
privacy should be in use, how they should be governed, how the
appropriateness of specific privacy rules should be evaluated, and by
whom.”168
Public input for algorithmic systems can also serve as a corrective to a
political system that devalues poor people. Extensive political science
research shows that legislators are most responsive to wealthy voters and
entities, and are largely nonresponsive to those lower on the income scale.169
The harms of algorithmic systems are most acute for marginalized people,
which may partly explain the lack of political will to constrain the massive
scale of data extraction. Professor Shoshana Zuboff has sounded the alarm
on “surveillance capitalism,” explaining the way in which “Big Tech” profits
from gathering people’s personal data in order to predict, and even shape,
consumer behavior, thereby threatening individual autonomy and democratic
norms.170 For low-income people and people of color, the resulting digital
profiles, compiled from individual’s personal data and that of their online
and offline friends and networks, limit their life opportunities.171 Their
digital profiles mark them as targets for predatory goods and services, such
as subprime loans and for-profit college scams.172 At the same time, digital
profiling serves as a gatekeeper that excludes them from mainstream
opportunities. Predictive algorithms are embedded in thousands of consumer
reports that score people in all aspects of their lives.173 For instance,
algorithmic determinations of creditworthiness determine access to and the
cost of loans, cars, jobs, insurance, and higher education.174 These “[s]cores
can become self-fulfilling prophecies, creating the financial distress they
claim merely to indicate.”175 And, these scores encode decades of systemic
racism in housing, employment, and mass incarceration.176 Not surprisingly,

168. Mir, supra note 162, at 255.
169. LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW
GILDED AGE 254–65 (2d ed. 2008) (finding that U.S. senators were responsive to the
ideological views of middle- and high-income constituents, while the views of “low income
constituents had no discernible impact” on their voting behavior); Martin Gilens, Inequality
and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 PUB. OP. Q. 778, 786, 788, 792 (2005) (showing a
statistical correlation between the views of higher income Americans and policy outcomes).
170. SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019).
171. Gilman, supra note 20, at 371.
172. See generally O’NEIL, supra note 21.
173. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2014); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
supra note 22.
174. Mary Madden, Michele Gilman, Karen Levy & Alice Marwick, Privacy, Poverty, and
Big Data: A Matrix of Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 53, 55–56
(2017).
175. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 173, at 18.
176. Lea Krivinskas Shepard, Toward a Stronger Financial History Antidiscrimination
Norm, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1695, 1704 (2012); see also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
JUSTICE-INVOLVED INDIVIDUALS AND THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL MARKETPLACE (2022),
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low-income people report higher levels of concern about their data privacy
but lower levels of confidence in how to manage it.177
On the government side of algorithmic deployment, Professor Virginia
Eubanks has described the rise of the “digital poorhouse,” in which
algorithms determine people’s access to social welfare programs in ways that
emphasize “punishment and containment,” thereby intensifying structural
inequalities.178 Algorithms sort homeless people into tiers of worthiness
determining who gets limited access to housing assistance; they
disproportionately scoop poor parents and parents of color into the child
welfare system, where these parents risk losing their children; and they churn
out eligibility decisions for access to Medicaid and other life-sustaining
safety net programs without adequate human review or avenues for
recourse.179 These dynamics led the United Nations special rapporteur on
extreme poverty to warn of a “digital welfare dystopia,” in which “[s]ystems
of social protection and assistance are increasingly driven by digital data and
technologies that are used . . . to automate, predict, identify, surveil, detect,
target and punish.”180 Professor Dorothy E. Roberts stresses the racialized
underpinnings of these systems, explaining that “predictive models that rely
on data structured by existing racial inequality predetermine a future that
corresponds to the past racial order.”181
Marginalized people also face intense surveillance in their neighborhoods,
schools, and workplaces, and the resulting data streams contribute to mass
incarceration, the school-to-prison pipeline, oppressive workplace
conditions, and subprime financial markets.182 There is a long history of
surveillance of marginalized populations,183 but technology adds scope,
speed, and scale to these historic dynamics of social control and carceral
categorization. Moreover, the lines between the private and public spheres
of algorithmic judgments are collapsing as private companies and
government agencies engage in extensive data sharing, and governments

https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_jic_report_2022-01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N3WR-N6EY].
177. MARY MADDEN, DATA & SOC’Y, PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND DIGITAL
INEQUALITY (2017), https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/DataAndSociety_
PrivacySecurityandDigitalInequality.pdf [https://perma.cc/D34C-DKZS].
178. EUBANKS, supra note 162, at 82.
179. Id.
180. Press Release, Off. of the High Comm’r, United Nations, World Stumbling
Zombie-Like into a Digital Welfare Dystopia, Warns UN Human Rights Expert (Oct. 17,
2019),
https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2019/10/world-stumbling-zombie-digitalwelfare-dystopia-warns-un-human-rights-expert [https://perma.cc/28MT-JP6B].
181. Roberts, supra note 9, at 1712.
182. Gilman, supra note 20, at 394–99.
183. On the history and practices of surveillance of marginalized people, see, for example,
SKINNER-THOMPSON, supra note 136, at 8–44 (surveillance of the economically
disadvantaged, racial and religious minorities, queer communities, and women); SIMONE
BROWNE, DARK MATTERS: ON THE SURVEILLANCE OF BLACKNESS (2015) (surveillance of
Black Americans); JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE,
AND THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 20–21 (2001) (surveillance of welfare recipients); EUBANKS,
supra note 162 (surveillance of the poor).
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purchase algorithmic systems from private vendors.184 This further hinders
accountability: private vendors become political actors lacking checks and
balances,185 and government agencies hide behind private contracts.186
Just as the needs and interests of marginalized people are not represented
in the political process, they are likewise not represented in the technology
design process. Across technical jobs and leadership positions, the tech
industry is overwhelmingly male, and white or Asian: no more than 5 percent
of the workforce in many Silicon Valley firms is Black, Hispanic, or
Indigenous.187 Women only represent approximately one-quarter of
technical jobs, and their numbers drop even lower in leadership positions.188
These disparities partly result from many barriers, including employers that
consistently prefer to recruit and hire workers who replicate the existing
workforce.189 There is also an “endpoint” problem,190 in which women,
Black, and Latinx workers who obtain tech jobs leave them at far higher rates
184. Roberts, supra note 9, at 1710; RUHA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER TECHNOLOGY:
ABOLITIONIST TOOLS FOR THE NEW JIM CODE 13–14, 53 (2019). For example, “[i]f someone
is marked ‘risky’ in one arena, that stigma follows him around much more efficiently,
streamlining marginalization.” Id. at 14.
185. BENJAMIN, supra note 184, at 53.
186. Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Transparency’s AI Problem, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. AT
COLUM. UNIV. (June 17, 2021), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/transparencys-ai-problem
[https://perma.cc/6DBS-T7KJ]; see also Okidegbe, supra note 16, at 3 (explaining how local
jurisdictions are outsourcing the creation of pretrial risk assessment algorithms to the private
sector).
187. This figure is an estimate based on data self-reported by several of the largest Silicon
Valley firms. See Sara Harrison, Five Years of Tech Diversity Reports—and Little Progress,
WIRED (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/five-years-tech-diversity-reports-littleprogress/ [https://perma.cc/F3XR-TCUQ]; Ayanna Howard & Charles Isbell, Diversity in AI:
The Invisible Men and Women, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (Sept. 21, 2020),
https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/diversity-in-ai-the-invisible-men-and-women/
[https://perma.cc/78XC-5R2Z]; see also Kristin N. Johnson, Automating the Risk of Bias, 87
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1214, 1223–25 (2019); id. at 1226–27 (explaining the need for diversity
in leadership positions for companies that develop and adopt automated decision-making
platforms). At the lower rungs of the industry, low-income people toil for low wages as “ghost
workers,” see MARY L. GRAY & SIDDHARTH SURI, GHOST WORK: HOW TO STOP SILICON
VALLEY FROM BUILDING A NEW GLOBAL UNDERCLASS (2019), and content moderators, see
SARAH T. ROBERTS, BEHIND THE SCREEN: CONTENT MODERATION IN THE SHADOWS OF SOCIAL
MEDIA (2019).
188. COSTANZA-CHOCK, supra note 117, at 73–74.
189. ALLISON SCOTT, FREADA KAPOR KLEIN, FRIEDA MCALEAR, ALEXIS MARTIN & SONIA
KOSHY, KAPOR CTR. FOR SOC. IMPACT, THE LEAKY TECH PIPELINE: A COMPREHENSIVE
FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING AND ADDRESSING THE LACK OF DIVERSITY ACROSS THE
TECH ECOSYSTEM 17 (2018), https://www.kaporcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/
KC18001_report_v6-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RMV-CV49]; see also Maya Beasley, There Is
a Supply of Diverse Workers in Tech, So Why Is Silicon Valley So Lacking in Diversity?, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/reports/
2017/03/29/429424/supply-diverse-workers-tech-silicon-valley-lacking-diversity/
[https://perma.cc/W53G-FB8F] (arguing that current efforts to improve diversity are failing).
190. Kimberly A. Houser, Can AI Solve the Diversity Problem in the Tech Industry?:
Mitigating Noise and Bias in Employment Decision-Making, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 290,
297–303 (2019) (stating that women leave the tech industry at a rate 45 percent higher than
men); Kyla Windley & Edith Pan, STAN. PIT LAB, Diversity in Tech: The Endpoint Problem,
MEDIUM (Oct. 28, 2020), https://medium.com/swlh/diversity-in-tech-the-endpoint-problem77f3265b6aab [https://perma.cc/B6AN-NRN8].
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than white men due to harassment, a lack of mentorship, exclusion, and
disrespect.191 The narrow worldview shared among programmers has
consequences. For instance, when designers imagine their default users, they
“most frequently assume that the unmarked user has access to several very
powerful privileges, such as US citizenship, English language proficiency,
access to broadband internet, a smartphone, a normatively abled body, and
so on.”192 For all these reasons, public participation could enhance
democratic values in algorithmic accountability.
B. Barriers
From the perspective of the corporate or governmental entities whose
products or processes are at issue, public participation can appear too time
intensive and too costly, with too little upside.193 From the perspective of
impacted communities, there are multiple barriers to meaningful
participation. To begin, the people whose voices are most needed tend to
face the largest hurdles to participation. Marginalized people often lack the
time for participation as they struggle to survive economically, and they can
face logistical hurdles such as lack of transportation, childcare, or language
access. Further, public participation can be challenging when scientific and
technical issues are being debated that call for certain levels of expertise.
Even when they engage in participatory processes, people from marginalized
communities can often find that they are tokenized: their participation is used
as window dressing to push through public policies that do not serve their
interest.194 They may find that their “perspectives . . . may be disregarded
due to factors such as race, culture, income, and language; a lack of
traditional markers of expertise such as educational or professional
credentials; and a lack of other resources that provide influence and
bargaining advantages.”195 In turn, this can generate community distrust of
191. COSTANZA-CHOCK, supra note 117, at 71 (“Tech companies reproduce intersectional
oppression through their hiring, retention, and promotion practices; through internal corporate
culture that tolerates misogyny, racism, and sexual harassment; and through the products they
design.”).
192. Id. at 77; see also Okidegbe, supra note 16, at 18 (pretrial risk assessment algorithms
are “constructed with the normative assumptions of their developers” in ways that do not align
with the needs or desires of impacted communities).
193. See Roberts, supra note 11, at 324, 339.
194. See Johannes Himmelreich, Against “Democratizing AI,” AI & SOC’Y (forthcoming),
https://johanneshimmelreich.net/papers/against-democratizing-AI.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
RL45-BQVJ] (arguing against broader public participation in AI regimes). Professor
Himmelreich notes: “Participation might be merely a chimera that masks a consolidation and
centralization of power—capital power or bureaucratic power. After all, it is a puzzle—if
there is so much value in participation—why there is so little of it.” Id. (manuscript at 19).
Himmelreich argues that democracy has done a bad job of assisting the poor, and thus he
queries why increased democracy would be beneficial in the context of AI that impacts
marginalized people. Id. (manuscript at 15).
195. Lee, supra note 16, at 414; see also Roberts, supra note 11, at 326, 337–38 (discussing
the dilemma of excluded or oppressed groups); Gius, supra note 152, at 83–84; Svitlana
Kravchenko, The Myth of Public Participation in a World of Poverty, 23 TULANE ENV’T L.J.
33, 45 (2009); McFarlane, supra note 145, at 914–15.
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the entities and government agencies overseeing a participatory process,
while diverting resources from other social justice reform efforts and making
it difficult to contest outcomes that “carry the presumption of community
endorsement.”196 Having a voice is meaningless without real power,197
while “a cosmetic process invariably favors those already in power.”198
These and other challenges to public participation are heightened in the
tech space. A lack of transparency around algorithmic systems hinders the
public from knowing and understanding how those decision-making systems
impact their lives.199 For instance, a prospective tenant may struggle to
obtain a rental, unaware that they are being repeatedly denied based on the
outcome of a tenant-screening algorithm.200 Or, a Black patient may get a
lower level of health care than a similarly ill white patient, unaware of this
difference or that it may have been caused by an algorithm.201 Or, a female
engineer may never learn why a corporate giant rejected her resume, unaware
that the company’s hiring algorithm learned to prefer men’s resumes.202
Further, without their knowledge, millions of users provide free labor to
technical systems—for instance, their clicks and uploads are used to refine
language and image processing algorithms.203 This participation is invisible
and uncompensated.
Transparency is further stymied because developers of algorithmic
systems want to protect their intellectual property and thus, vigorously claim
trade secrecy protection when challenged.204 In the face of open records

196. Wendy A. Bach, Governance, Accountability, and the New Poverty Agenda, 2010
WIS. L. REV. 239, 267. There are risks that superficial participation can be used “as a paper
trail to push back against claims of unfair harm from those adversely affected by the
algorithm.” Ari Ezra Waldman, Power, Process, and Automated Decision-Making,
88 FORDHAM L. REV. 613, 629 (2019).
197. Jaime Alison Lee, Poverty, Dignity, and Public Housing, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 97, 135 (2015).
198. See Lee, supra note 16.
199. See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 186, at 11–13.
200. See Lauren Kirchner, The Obscure Yet Powerful Tenant-Screening Industry Is Finally
Getting Some Scrutiny, THE MARKUP (Jan. 11, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://themarkup.org/lockedout/2021/01/11/the-obscure-yet-powerful-tenant-screening-industry-is-finally-getting-somescrutiny [https://perma.cc/E5D7-DMTR].
201. See Ziad Obermeyer, Brian Powers, Christine Vogeli & Sendhil Mullainathan,
Dissecting Racial Bias in an Algorithm Used to Manage the Health of Populations, 366 SCI.
447, 450 (2019).
202. See Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool That Showed Bias
Against Women, REUTERS (Oct. 10, 2018, 7:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usamazon-com-jobs-automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showedbias-against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G [https://perma.cc/5VBE-SX5V].
203. See MONA SLOANE, EMANUEL MOSS, OLAITAN AWOMOLO & LAURA FORLANO,
PARTICIPATION IS NOT A DESIGN FIX FOR MACHINE LEARNING 2 (2020),
https://www.datascienceassn.org/sites/default/files/Participation%20is%20not%20a%20Desi
gn%20Fix%20for%20Machine%20Learning.pdf [https://perma.cc/GV29-JQT7] (“Billions of
ordinary web users also continually participate in the production and refinement of [machine
learning], as their online (and offline) activities produce neatly labeled rows of data on how
they click their way around the web, navigate their streets, and engage in any number of other
commercial, leisure, or romantic activities.”).
204. See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 186, at 8.
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requests, even public agencies will assert a trade secrecy defense for
algorithmic systems that they purchase under the terms of procurement
contracts.205 As a result, the internal workings of an algorithm are a “black
box,” hidden from public scrutiny.206 Even if the box is opened, some
algorithms conduct machine learning operations that are so complex that
their makers cannot explain how the algorithms arrive at their outcomes.207
Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that regular people have ample expertise
about the impacts of technology on their lives, and thus, this expertise needs
to be validated.208
Another barrier is the phenomenon of “techno-chauvinism,” as Professor
Meredith Broussard terms it, or a human belief in the infallibility of computer
outcomes based on their seeming objectivity.209 Professor Ruha Benjamin
explains the way in which uncritical faith in technology has generated “the
New Jim Code,” or “the employment of new technologies that reflect and
reproduce existing inequities but that are promoted and perceived as more
objective or progressive than the discriminatory systems of a previous
era.”210 A rich literature explains the follies of these assumptions, given that
human beings design algorithmic systems, and their judgments get embedded
at multiple stages of the design process.211 Nevertheless, many people fall
prey to “automation bias,” or the tendency to believe in a computerized
outcome over one’s human judgment.212 And, most people lack the training,
knowledge, or confidence to retain a healthy skepticism toward algorithmic
systems.
If these barriers are not recognized and addressed, the risks of public
participation amounting to mere window dressing increase. A group of
machine learning scholars observe that the discourse of participation can be
rhetorically appealing, but often “fails to account for existing power
dynamics and obscures the extractive nature of collaboration, openness, and
205. See Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart
City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 152–57 (2018).
206. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015).
207. See Roberts, supra note 9, at 171.
208. See generally TAWANA PETTY, MARIELLA SABA, TAMIKA LEWIS, SEETA PEÑA
GANGADHARAN & VIRGINIA EUBANKS, OUR DATA BODIES, RECLAIMING OUR DATA (2018),
https://www.odbproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ODB.InterimReport.FINAL_.7.16.
2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EXS-HSC4] (describing a research justice project in which
marginalized people described the ways in which they experience data collection and
data-driven systems).
209. MEREDITH BROUSSARD, ARTIFICIAL UNINTELLIGENCE:
HOW COMPUTERS
MISUNDERSTAND THE WORLD (2018).
210. BENJAMIN, supra note 184, at 5–6.
211. See Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 205, at 119 (“Algorithmic governance has a
politics. Judgments are encoded in the algorithmic process at all stages.”); Waldman, supra
note 196, at 616 (“[A]lgorithmic decision-making hides the fact that engineers and their
corporate employers are choosing winners and losers while steadfastly remaining agnostic
about the social, political, and economic consequences of their work.”).
212. Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 205, at 126 (“Government officials may defer to
algorithmic output even when it is erroneous, discriminatory, or framed in terms of categories
that are too coarse or outcomes that are too narrow.”).
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sharing.”213 As a result, it is essential to acknowledge “that partnerships and
justice do not scale in frictionless ways, but require constant maintenance
and articulation with existing social formation in new contexts.”214 The
required level of intentionality to avoid “participation washing” is, of course,
the focus of this Article.
C. Participatory Democracy and Democratic Deliberation
While public participation could enhance algorithmic accountability,
particularly for marginalized groups, there is no fixed template for what
meaningful participation looks like in this realm. Moreover, not all
participation is the same. In the 1960s, Sherry Arnstein developed an
influential “ladder of citizen participation”215 that includes eight levels of
participation, “with each rung corresponding to the extent of citizens’ power
in determining the end product.”216 At the bottom levels are nonparticipatory
mechanisms in which power holders talk at participants through
manipulation and therapy.217 The ladder then progresses to token levels of
participation consisting of informing, consultation, and placation—at these
rungs, citizens may be heard, but they lack the power to shape outcomes.218
Many public participation tools exist at these middle levels; the most notable
is the notice-and-comment requirement for government agencies issuing
regulations with the force of law. The public has the right to comment on the
proposals, and the agency must consider those comments, but ultimately, the
agency makes the final decision.219 By contrast, at the top three rungs of the
ladder, citizens gain power “with increasing degrees of decision-making
clout” from partnership to delegation to citizen control.220 At the top level
of citizen control, “have-not citizens” hold a majority of the decision-making
seats or even full managerial control.221 This is not to say that the higher
rungs are necessarily superior; as Professor Barbara L. Bezdek points out,
“[i]ncreased control may not always be desired by the community, and

213. SLOANE ET AL., supra note 203, at 2.
214. Id. at 4.
215. Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 216
(1969). There are many ways to conceptualize modes of public participation; Rikki John Dean
helpfully conceptualizes them in terms of competing theories of democracy and public
administration. Rikki John Dean, Beyond Radicalism and Resignation: The Competing Logics
for Public Participation in Policy Decisions, 45 POL’Y & POL. 213 (2017).
216. From the bottom to the top, the rungs are manipulation, therapy, informing,
consultation, placation, partnership, delegated power, and citizen control. See Arnstein, supra
note 215, at 217.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. On the duties of agencies to take comments seriously, see generally Donald J. Kochan,
The Commenting Power: Agency Accountability Through Public Participation, 70 OKLA. L.
REV. 601 (2018).
220. See Arnstein, supra note 215, at 217.
221. See id.
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increased control without necessary supports . . . may produce what the
community would regard as failure.”222
The upper tiers of Arnstein’s ladder are supported by at least two
underlying theoretical frameworks:
participatory democracy and
deliberative democracy. For Professor Carole Pateman, a leading theorist of
participatory democracy, the goal is to shift democratic power away from
political elites and toward the people.223 Writing in 1970, she argued that
democracy emerges from public participation in all areas of life—from the
home, to schools, to the workplace, to politics.224 In her theory,
“‘participation’ refers to (equal) participation in the making of decisions, and
‘political equality’ refers to equality of power in determining the outcome of
decisions . . . .”225 True participation requires including people who lack
power and privilege226 and reflects a belief that all people have the potential
for political learning.227 She stresses the ways in which participation in
various spheres of life begets political participation as people develop
democratic skills and procedures.228
Both Pateman and Arnstein wrote in the early 1970s, a time of political
foment and large-scale social disruptions.
In subsequent decades,
participatory theory took a less political turn that focused on process rather
than substantive shifts in power relations. Under the theory of deliberative
democracy, democratic legitimacy is secured by deliberation among citizens
who engage in an exchange of reasons in an inclusive setting.229 This is not
a mere duel of ideas in a debate; rather, it involves a dialogue of exchanging
viewpoints and the deliberative process of providing reasons.230 It creates a
“real link between the public will and the public policies and office-holders
who are selected.”231 Through the process of deliberation, citizens are more
222. Bezdek, supra note 146, at 43; see also Fung, supra note 146, at 67; PETER J. BALINT,
RONALD E. STEWART, ANAND DESAI & LAWRENCE C. WALTERS, WICKED ENVIRONMENTAL
PROBLEMS 111 (2011).
223. See generally CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970).
224. Id. at 108–09. Professor Pateman writes, “the scope of the term ‘political’ is extended
to cover spheres outside national government.” Id. at 106. And indeed, her empirical study
focused on the workplace.
225. Id. at 43.
226. Id. at 21.
227. Id. at 47.
228. Id. at 105.
229. Jon Elster, Introduction to DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 1, 8 (Jon Elster ed. 1998); see
also JANE MANSBRIDGE, JAMES BOHMAN, SIMONE CHAMBERS, THOMAS CHRISTIANO, ARCHON
FUNG, JOHN PARKINSON, DENNIS F. THOMPSON & MARK E. WARREN, A SYSTEMIC APPROACH
TO DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, in DELIBERATIVE SYSTEMS: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AT
THE LARGE SCALE 1, 11 (John Parkinson & Jane Mansbridge eds., 2012) (“A healthy
deliberative system is one in which relevant considerations are brought forth from all corners,
aired, discussed, and appropriately weighed.”).
230. See Bezdek, supra note 146, at 33.
231. James S. Fishkin & Jane Mansbridge, Introduction, 146 DÆDALUS, Summer 2017, 6,
7. “[T]he core justification of deliberative democracy as a political ideal [is] that the
legitimacy of our collective political arrangements (institutions, laws, policies) rests on mutual
justification enacted through deliberative practices amongst free and equal citizens.” David
Owen & Graham Smith, Deliberation, Democracy, and the Systemic Turn, 23 J. POL. PHIL.
213, 218 (2015).
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likely to accept political decisions, even if they are on the losing end.232
Deliberative democracy assumes that citizen preferences are not fixed, but
develop through the deliberative process,233 which is “expected to lead to
empathy with the other and a broadened sense of people’s own interests.”234
These theorists promote a variety of practical mechanisms designed to
improve, and not replace, representative democracy;235 indeed, it is a
“normative project grounded in political theory.”236 These mechanisms
include mini-publics, which are fora where small groups of citizens drawn
from a representative range of backgrounds are first educated about issues
essential to their communities and subsequently debate them.237
Participatory democracy focuses on the importance of citizen governance
in the transformation of power imbalances at all levels of society, while
deliberative democracy centers on securing democratic legitimacy through
discussion and debate.238 Tech resistance movements are forms of
participatory democracy, while AIA proposals and participatory design
practices share the process-based focus of deliberative democracy. Professor
Ari Waldman has critiqued these latter, technocratic approaches to
algorithmic accountability as reinforcing the failures of neoliberalism. 239 In
other words, the neoliberal norms that govern technology development
“prioritize[] freedom and efficiency above all other values,” and thus,
compliance mechanisms that focus on process will reinforce, rather than
disrupt, these norms.240 The question is whether public participation
mechanisms that are mandated through regulation can ever provide a serious
corrective to these neoliberal dynamics. Given the complicated calculus of
the benefits and barriers of public participation, lessons from other regulatory
regimes can provide some guidance in designing public participation
mandates for algorithmic accountability and data privacy regulation.
III. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN LAW
Public participation is a norm in several American legal regimes that have
operated for decades, and these areas provide numerous lessons for
enhancing democracy in the datafied society. Accordingly, this part
232. See David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1764
(2005).
233. See Peter Biegelbaurer & James Hansen, Democratic Theory and Citizen
Participation: Democracy Models in the Evaluation of Public Participation in Science and
Technology, 38 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 589, 591 (2011).
234. Tali Mendelberg, The Deliberative Citizen: Theory and Evidence, 6 POL. DECISION
MAKING DELIBERATION & PARTICIPATION 151, 153 (2002).
235. See Simone Chambers, Deliberation & Mass Democracy, in DELIBERATIVE SYSTEMS:
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AT THE LARGE SCALE, supra note 229, at 52, 53.
236. Nicole Curato, John S. Dryzek, Selen A. Ercan, Carolyn M. Hendriks & Simon
Niemeyer, Twelve Key Findings in Deliberative Democracy Research, 146 DÆDALUS,
Summer 2017, 28, 28.
237. See Fishkin & Mansbridge, supra note 231, at 8.
238. See R.W. Hildreth, Word and Deed: A Deweyan Integration of Deliberative and
Participatory Democracy, 34 NEW POL. SCI. 295, 295–97 (2012).
239. Waldman, supra note 196.
240. Id. at 615.
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examines public participation mandates in environmental law, with special
attention to the environmental justice movement, anti-poverty programs, and
land use decision-making. Overall, these regimes demonstrate the
importance of building intentional structures that involve marginalized
communities, a commitment to valuing the expertise of the impacted public,
and a willingness to share power and adapt in response to feedback.
A. Environmental Protection
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969241 (NEPA) declares “a
national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony
between man and his environment.”242 Considered the Magna Carta of
environmental law,243 NEPA grants citizens procedural rights for obtaining
government information and providing public input in environmental
decision-making, which in turn provides agencies with greater information
about the consequences of their actions.244 Under NEPA, federal agencies
must prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) before taking any
major action that might have “significant” effects on the environment.245 So,
for instance, before a highway may be built, toxic waste cleaned up,
genetically modified crops approved, or a permit for logging issued, the
relevant agency must conduct an environmental assessment. An EIS is a
“detailed statement” that discusses the environmental status of the impacted
area, describes the positive and negative projected environmental, economic,
and social impacts of the proposed action, and considers alternatives.246

241. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347.
242. Id. § 4321.
243. LINDA LUTHER, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: BACKGROUND AND
IMPLEMENTATION 2 (2008), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33152.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Z72YDS5]; John C. Ruple & Mark Capone, NEPA—Substantive Effectiveness Under a
Procedural Mandate: Assessment of Oil and Gas EISs in the Mountain West, 7 GEO. WASH.
J. ENERGY & ENV’T L. 39, 40 (2016).
244. See Ted Boling, Making the Connection:
NEPA Processes for National
Environmental Policy, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 313, 317–18 (2010).
245. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The act also created the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ), housed in the Executive Office of the President, which, with executive authority from
the president, issued regulations to implement NEPA. LUTHER, supra note 243, at 1, 10–11.
The CEQ does not have enforcement authority. See id. at 2 n.1. In addition, each federal
agency has its own regulations implementing NEPA. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(a) (2022).
Other substantive environmental acts—such as the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act,
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), and the Endangered Species Act of 1973—also contain opportunities for public
participation.
246. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). If the anticipated impact does not rise to the threshold level
of “significant,” the agency instead prepares an environmental assessment (EA), identifying
the environmental consequences and creating a record about the expected impacts of the
proposed action, including the persons and agencies who were consulted in preparing the
record. Id. At that point, the agency can issue a “finding of no significant impact” (FONSI)
and move forward with the project. Id. In the EA process, most agencies make drafts available
to the public and receive input before issuing the FONSI. See Nicholas A. Fromherz, From
Consultation to Consent: Community Approval as a Prerequisite to Environmentally
Significant Projects, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 109, 120–21 (2013) (describing the EA process).
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From the wealth of decades of NEPA experience and the volume of studies
on its impacts, certain lessons can be drawn that could be useful in the realm
of digital privacy, particularly given the parallels between environmental and
data protection. Both the environment and privacy are valuable resources
that are difficult, if not impossible, to regain once lost. As Cathy O’Neil
states: “If you think of [data mining] as a factory, unfairness is the black
stuff belching out of the smoke stacks. It’s an emission, a toxic one.”247
Data’s ubiquity has made it like the environment, such that it is “now
everything and almost no area of human endeavor lies apart from its
reach.”248 Both the environment and personal data are resources that help
individuals in pursuing an autonomous version of a good life, and help
society at large, given the collective interest in a healthy environment and
privacy. Both are under immense pressure from business interests that seek
to monetize their value. Both involve complex scientific and technical issues
that are nevertheless intertwined with social and cultural values.249 For all
these reasons, it is not surprising that NEPA has been influential for privacy
scholars and activists thinking about algorithmic accountability.250
NEPA allows for public input at several stages in the EIS process. Once
the agency determines that an EIS is necessary, the agency issues a notice of
intent setting forth the scope of issues raised by the proposed project.251 At
this stage, the agency must actively seek input from the public and other
agencies, and provide an opportunity “to suggest issues and alternatives the
agency should consider, and to identify impacts that are of concern to the
community.”252 The agency then prepares a draft EIS, which must be
available for public comment for at least forty-five days, and a hearing is
required if the proposed action is substantially controversial.253 In addition,
the agency is charged with “affirmatively soliciting comments from those
persons or organizations who may be interested or affected,”254 and publicity
about the project and opportunities for comment can be disseminated in

247. See O’NEIL, supra note 21, at 95.
248. Marc B. Mihaly, Citizen Participation in the Making of Environmental Decisions:
Evolving Obstacles and Potential Solutions Through Partnership with Experts and Agents, 27
PACE ENV’T L. REV. 151, 169 (2009).
249. See id. at 169–70 (explaining the complexity of environmental issues); BALINT ET AL.,
supra note 222, at 2 (describing wicked environmental problems as those “characterized by a
high degree of scientific uncertainty and deep disagreement on values”). The overlap is more
than an analogy: environmental decision-making increasingly relies on algorithmic tools that
“impede equity and democratic participation, without deliberate countermeasures.” Sonya
Ziaja, How Algorithm-Assisted Decision Making Is Influencing Environmental Law and
Climate Adaptation, 48 ECOLOGY L.Q. 899, 902 (2021).
250. See Selbst, supra note 42, at 169–72; MOSS ET AL., supra note 36, at 19; Kaminski &
Malgieri, supra note 9, at 135; Froomkin, supra note 40, at 1749–50.
251. See LUTHER, supra note 243, at 18.
252. See COMMUNITY GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND NEPA METHODS 15 (2019),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2019/05/f63/NEPA%20Community%20Guide%202
019.pdf [https://perma.cc/697L-7T2P].
253. See LUTHER, supra note 243, at 18–19.
254. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (2022).
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multiple ways, including through the media.255 After the comment period,
the agency prepares the final EIS. While the agency is not bound to follow
the majority will of the public, it must respond to the comments received.256
Throughout the process, agencies must provide public notice of any hearings,
public meetings, and the availability of documents about the proposed
action.257
NEPA is an extremely influential statute that spurred the enactment of
“little NEPAs” at the state level and inspired similar environmental laws
across the globe and in other fields.258 NEPA, however, is divisive, and
debates over the EIS process mirror those about public participation
generally. NEPA supporters contend that it provides a venue for agencies to
hear about and consider public views on environmental implications before
they take action. Opposition comes from two directions.259 The
industry-friendly critique charges that the EIS process is overly burdensome
in terms of time and money, and that the public lacks the necessary expertise
to add substance to the discussion.260 More progressive critics query whether
public input is meaningful, especially given that citizens are invited to
comment only after the major decision to undertake an EIS is made,261 and

255. See Erica Morrell, Public Comment Periods and Federal Environmental Impact
Statements: Potentials and Pitfalls from the American Experience, 1 MICH. J. SUSTAINABILITY
93, 99 (2013). Professor Morrell notes, “[t]he methods used to alert the public of a comment
period can constrain and enable participation, shaping who knows about and has access to the
comment period—at times further limiting the participation of already marginalized sectors
of the population such as the disabled, minorities, and low-income groups.” Id.
256. George K. Foster, Community Participation in Development, 51 VAND. J.
TRANSACTIONAL L. 39, 60 (2018) (“Even if a majority of an affected community opposes a
proposal, the responsible agency can still approve it; affected communities do not have a
veto.”).
257. See LUTHER, supra note 243, at 26.
258. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 905–06 (2002). The
Aarhus Convention, ratified by countries in Europe and Central Asia, requires publication
participation in environmental matters, and more than 100 countries have EIA-style
requirements. See Foster, supra note 256, at 64–65.
259. See Froomkin, supra note 40, at 1782 (summarizing critiques including derision of
the EIS process as “comprised of make-work, boilerplate, and Cover Your Ass”).
260. See, e.g., Lisa Friedman, Trump Weakens Major Conservation Law to Speed
Construction Permits, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/15/climate/trumpenvironment-nepa.html [https://perma.cc/7UUK-J5HY] (Oct. 6, 2021). But see BEIERLE &
CAYFORD, supra note 149, at 27 (the authors counter that “the case studies suggest that the
public is perfectly capable of improving decision quality”).
261. See Karkkainen, supra note 258, at 924 (stating that EISs are prepared “at the end of
a protracted, multistage project development and clearance process . . . this is long after the
‘real’ commencement of agency resources to the project has been made”). Another critique
is that the comment process does not result in meaningful dialogue among and between
commenters and agency officials; by the time the proposed rule is released, the agency is
unlikely to make significant changes. See Albert Lin, Power to the People: Restoring the
Public Voice in Environmental Law, 46 AKRON L. REV. 1017, 1021 (2013). And, there are
concerns that public participation mandates, along with other NEPA-style requirements, will
slow down urgently needed responses to climate change. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, What
Happens When the Green New Deal Meets the Old Green Laws?, 44 VT. L. REV. 693,
697–98, 719 (2020).
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given that public input does not continue throughout the life cycle of a
project. Further, marginalized communities can struggle to participate due
to logistical, technical, and cultural barriers.262 These power imbalances can
favor economic interests over values of fairness and equity.263
These competing viewpoints have been extensively tested and studied.264
A meta-analysis of over 239 case studies by Thomas C. Beierle and Jerry
Cayford assessed whether NEPA met five benchmarks for public
participation: (1) incorporating public values into decisions, (2) improving
the substantive quality of decisions, (3) resolving conflicts among competing
interests, (4) building trust in institutions, and (5) educating and informing
the public.265 They concluded that “[c]onsiderably more public participation
cases in our database produced good outcomes than produced bad
outcomes.”266 The processes “were most successful in educating and
informing the public and least successful in building trust in institutions.”267
The highest rates of success were associated with more intensive
processes.268 Yet these intensive processes have a downside: they are less
likely to engage the broader public and to have representatives from a wide
range of socioeconomic backgrounds.269 Thus, the authors recommend
harnessing the “problem-solving capabilities of intensive participatory
mechanisms with the broad involvement of the public more often found in
the less-intensive mechanisms.”270 More specifically, they advise making
representatives responsible to their broader constituencies, combining

262. See Fromherz, supra note 246, at 134 (“Giving a voice to the public is not the same
as listening to the public.”).
263. See Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the
Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 3, 49–50 (1998).
264. The Council on Environmental Quality, the federal office that oversees NEPA
implementation, conducted a major study of NEPA’s effectiveness at its twenty-five-year
anniversary. COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A
STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS (1997), http://pasecorps.org/wp/
wp-content/uploads/2016/09/NEPA-Study-of-its-Effectiveness-after-25-years.pdf
[https://perma.cc/24TF-KRTG]. The study concluded that NEPA’s success “heavily depends
on whether an agency has systematically reached out to those who will be most affected by a
proposal, gathered information and ideas from them, and responded to the input by modifying
or adding alternatives, throughout the entire course of a planning process.” Id. at 17; see also
Marion Hourdequin, Peter Landres, Mark J. Hanson & David R. Craig, Ethical Implications
of Democratic Theory for U.S. Public Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment, 35
ENV’T IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 37, 37 (2012) (“Unequal political influence among different
participants, a perceived lack of public access to the collaborative process itself, or skepticism
about the actual influence of stakeholder participation on agency decisions often leads to
mistrust and dissatisfaction with agency outcomes.”).
265. See BEIERLE & CAYFORD, supra note 149, at 16. In assessing these objectives, the
authors examined four types of participatory mechanisms: public meetings and hearings,
advisory committees not seeking consensus, advisory committees seeking consensus, and
negotiations and mediations. Id. at 47.
266. Id. at 33.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 47.
269. Id. at 48.
270. Id. at 49.
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various participatory mechanisms, and using technology to engage in
large-group deliberative processes.271
The Bierle & Cayford study highlights the challenge of ensuring
meaningful participation for marginalized communities. The environmental
justice movement has sought to overcome this barrier and thus is an
essential—but heretofore overlooked—resource for structuring the AIA
process.272 In the late 1980s, the environmental justice movement took root,
and it argued that privileged white people systematically receive the benefits
of environmental protection, while poor people of color systematically incur
the environmental risk.273 People with low incomes and/or racial and ethnic
minorities disproportionately live near hazardous waste facilities and other
industrial hazards, and their neighborhoods, air, and water are more polluted
than those in wealthier and white communities.274 And yet, white,
middle-class people have long dominated the environmental movement with
an emphasis on resource degradation rather than social justice.275 The
environmental justice movement has its origins in a 1982 protest in Warren
County, North Carolina, over the dumping of toxic soil containing
carcinogenic compounds called polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in a
landfill located in a majority Black community.276 Over 500 protesters were
arrested over six weeks of marches and protests.277 The movement against
environmental racism soon expanded through networks across the country,
using civil rights–organizing tactics and pressuring mainstream
271. Id. Professors Dorothy M. Daley and Tony G. Reames note that valuable perspectives
can be lost when government agencies recruit participants from organized groups because it
“tends to result in a similar set of engaged stakeholders taking part in the decision-making
process.” Dorothy M. Daley & Tony G. Reames, Public Participation and Environmental
Justice: Access to Federal Decision Making, in FAILED PROMISES: EVALUATING THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 143, 147 (David Konisky ed., 2015).
272. See generally LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP:
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT (2001).
273. See Sheila Foster, Environmental Justice in an Era of Devolved Collaboration, 26
HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 459, 461 (2002); see also Gauna, supra note 263, at 8. “Although the
causes of environmental inequities remain hotly disputed, there remains strong evidence of
race- and income-based disparities in environmental burdens, ranging from the location of
commercial hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities to poor air quality.”
David Konisky, Federal Environmental Justice Policy: Lessons Learned, in FAILED
PROMISES: EVALUATING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE, supra note 271, at 233, 234.
274. COLE & FOSTER, supra note 272, at 55.
Waste facility siting battles are but one aspect of the movement for environmental
justice, which also concerns itself with the cleanup of contaminated industrial sites,
the elimination of occupational hazards, lead abatement, enforcement of existing
environmental regulations, and the guarantee of representation in the environmental
decision-making process. The movement for environmental justice is also about
creating clean jobs, building a sustainable economy, guaranteeing safe and
affordable housing, and achieving racial and social justice.
Id. at 17.
275. See Daley & Reames, supra note 271, at 148.
276. See Daniel Faber & Deborah McCarthy, The Evolving Structure of the Environmental
Justice Movement in the United States: New Models for Democratic Decision-Making, 14
SOC. JUST. RSCH. 405, 414 (2002).
277. Id.
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environmental organizations and government agencies to pay heed to the
issue.278 A foundational principle of environmental justice is that the people
impacted should be afforded “the right to participate as equal partners at
every level of decision-making, including needs assessment, planning,
implementation, enforcement, and evaluation.”279 Overall, this movement
shifted the approach to public participation from a solely functionalist one
(valuing input to improve the quality of decisions) toward a more deliberative
one (emphasizing emancipatory concepts of sharing power with less
privileged groups in society).280
In 1994, President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 12898281 requiring
federal agencies, as part of the EIS process, to “identify[] and address[], as
appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or
environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority
populations and low-income populations.”282 The executive order makes
“[e]nvironmental equity . . . a core consideration in federal environmental
decision making,”283 and while its impact has waxed and waned with the
political winds,284 it remains in effect to this day, and there is a governmental
infrastructure built around environmental justice.285 The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has issued guidance to its staff for considering
environmental justice in regulatory actions.286 In addition, the National
Environmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC), comprised of expert
stakeholders from outside the EPA, makes recommendations to the

278. See id. at 415–19.
279. THE PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (1991), https://www.ejnet.org/ej/
principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/637J-VJE8].
280. Ortwin Renn & Pia-Johanna Schweizer, Inclusive Risk Governance: Concepts and
Application to Environmental Policy Making, 19 ENV’T POL’Y. GOV. 174, 181 (2009). The
authors describe six theoretical approaches to public participation: functionalist, neoliberal,
deliberative, anthropological, emancipatory, and postmodern. Id. at 176. “The diversity of
concepts and background philosophies is one of the reasons why participatory processes are
so difficult to evaluate in terms of overarching evaluative criteria.” Id. at 181.
281. Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
282. Id. at 7629.
283. David Konisky, Introduction to FAILED PROMISES: EVALUATING THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 271, at 1, 4.
284. David Konisky, The Federal Government’s Response to Environmental Inequality, in
FAILED PROMISES: EVALUATING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE, supra note 271, at 29, 48; see also Caroline Farrell, A Just Transition: Lessons
Learned from the Environmental Justice Movement, 4 DUKE F.L. & SOC. CHANGE 45, 51
(2012) (“The order is significantly limited by the fact that it is not enforceable. There are no
consequences if an agency fails to follow the order.”).
285. The Office of Environmental Justice within the EPA is charged with coordinating
environmental justice efforts across the agency, and the EPA’s programmatic offices and
regional offices also have staff assigned to environmental justice responsibilities. Konisky,
supra note 284, at 38. In an executive order addressing climate change, President Joe Biden
charged the federal agencies with “achieving environmental justice part of their missions.”
Exec. Order No. 14008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7619, 7629 (Feb. 1, 2021).
286. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON CONSIDERING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE DURING
THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGULATORY ACTIONS (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2015-06/documents/considering-ej-in-rulemaking-guide-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YF3Y-9PLU].
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agency,287 including through detailed reports on broadening public
participation in environmental decision-making.288 These blueprints are
equally useful in the context of algorithmic decision-making systems.
These guidance documents highlight the logistical barriers to participation
facing low-income people and racial and ethnic minorities. These barriers
are not insurmountable. For instance, meetings can be set at hours that
working people can attend and in locations that are easily accessible.
Transportation, food, and childcare may need to be provided, as well as
financial assistance to facilitate participation. In addition, language access
may be required to ensure that non-English speakers can participate. The
issue and opportunities for participation should be publicized through
multiple mediums and organizations,289 accompanied by affirmative
outreach to community groups that can identify and bring stakeholders to the
table. Impacted people should have input into the design of participatory
processes,290 as they can work with decision-makers to identify and
overcome hurdles.291 The EPA recommends that decision-makers carefully
consider and select from a range of participatory mechanisms, pointing in
particular to the “spectrum of public involvement” set forth by the
International Association for Public Participation.292 For instance, among
the ten tools for generating in-person public input, the EPA suggests using
focus groups, study circles, charrettes,293 and computer-assisted
processes.294 Among consensus-building techniques, the EPA suggests
soliciting input from advisory boards, workshops, and citizen juries.

287. Konisky, supra note 284, at 30.
288. NAT’L ENV’T JUST. ADVISORY COUNCIL, MODEL GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION: AN UPDATE TO THE 1996 NEJAC MODEL PLAN FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
(2013),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-02/documents/recommendationsmodel-guide-pp-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/QNR3-3FYL].
289. “Remote towns and villages disseminate information using local radio stations, CB
radio, local newspapers, placing posters at grocery stores, trading posts, or at
village/community center/chapter meetings . . . . In many instances, reaching parents of
school-age children may be facilitated through schools.” ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, supra note
286, at 34.
290. Early and regular consultation with stakeholders is essential and includes giving
“minority populations, low-income populations, tribes, and indigenous peoples” a role in
designing the participatory process. Id. at 32; see also NAT’L ENV’T JUST. ADVISORY COUNCIL,
supra note 288, at 3.
291. See Jennifer Dodge, Environmental Justice and Deliberative Democracy: How Social
Change Organizations Respond to Power in the Deliberative System, 3 POL’Y & SOC’Y 225,
227–28 (2017) (“[T]echnical-rational discourses dominate policy analysis and can constrain
public discourse by narrowing the range of possible problem definitions and solutions, often
undermining direct experience[s] . . . for example, of racial injustices.”).
292. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, supra note 286, at 33 n.33 (referring to www.IAP2.org).
293. “A charrette is an intensive, multi-disciplinary workshop with the aim of developing
a design or vision for a project or planning activity.” Public Participation Guide: Charrettes,
ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/international-cooperation/public-participationguide-charrettes [https://perma.cc/K5HX-5QNZ] (last visited Oct. 7, 2022).
294. Public Participation Guide: Tools to Generate and Obtain Public Input, ENV’T PROT.
AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/international-cooperation/public-participation-guide-toolsgenerate-and-obtain-public-input [https://perma.cc/GB4H-SX6K] (last visited Oct. 7, 2022).
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Once logistical barriers are overcome and participatory methods are
selected, the process must allow for meaningful input by the public. This
means that the public must have opportunities for participation early in the
project, rather than be invited to comment on a finalized plan.295 In addition,
capacity building is key.296 As a result, materials need to be “concise,
understandable and readily accessible,”297 and participants may need
education and support on technical issues.298 In this vein, Professor Jonathan
Skinner-Thompson recommends providing grant funds to impacted
communities so that they can hire their own technical advisors—a current
feature of the federal Superfund law that could be expanded.299 He points to
studies showing that the involvement of these technical advisors not only
increases public confidence in projects, but also leads to better decisions.300
Similarly, one study of an advisory group working on the issue of DNA
research found that “when a participatory body is given sufficient time,
information, and opportunity to make decisions that will have a real impact
on issues that truly matter to the participants, it can achieve a high level of
sophistication and understanding.”301
These efforts at capacity building should be tailored to the specific
communities impacted: “Common elements of engagement should not
overshadow the uniqueness of every community.”302 Cross-cultural
awareness is thus essential,303 particularly multicultural sensitivity to the
perspectives and needs of all persons, especially the least powerful. To build
trust, government officials have to recognize and respect that “[m]inority
populations, low-income populations, tribes, and indigenous peoples have
unique knowledge of their goals, needs and vulnerabilities.”304 They are “an
‘encyclopedia of experientially-tested and validated insight,’” and
consultation with them is the “foundation of community engagement
efforts.”305 Thus, participatory processes should accept multiple forms of

295. See Farrell, supra note 284, at 60.
296. See id. at 59 (describing an effective grassroots case study for public participation in
which the initiative began with “a series of trainings in order to build the community residents’
capacity to engage in discussions about transitioning to a green economy”).
297. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, supra note 286, at 33.
298. “Examples of such assistance could include facilitation of discussions among
stakeholders, funding resources, workshops and trainings in the relevant subject.” NAT’L
ENV’T JUST. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 288, at 6.
299. Jonathan Skinner-Thompson, Procedural Environmental Justice, 97 WASH. L. REV.
399, 432, 439–40 (2022).
300. Id. at 445–46.
301. Jonathan Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective on the National Environmental
Policy Act’s Process for Citizen Participation, 26 ENV’T L. 53, 93 (1996) (quoting Bruce
Jennings, Representation and Participation in the Democratic Governance of Science and
Technology, in GOVERNING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN A DEMOCRACY 223, 240 (Malcom
L. Goggin ed., 1986)).
302. NAT’L ENV’T JUST. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 288, at 2.
303. See id. at 5.
304. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, supra note 286, at 32.
305. NAT’L ENV’T JUST. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 288, at 2.

2022]

BEYOND WINDOW DRESSING

543

input.306 At the same time, the entities that design and oversee public
participation mechanisms need to maintain a culture that values participation
as a goal in itself. “[D]ecisionmakers must recognize the legitimacy of public
values and understand that those values may lead to priorities and
conclusions that agencies (which have their own understanding of what the
public interest is) find wrong.”307 And, they must communicate honestly
about the “goals, expectations, and limitations” of the participatory
process.308
In light of these expanding norms around public participation, some
federal agencies have sometimes gone above and beyond NEPA’s minimum
requirements, seeking innovative ways to make public input more satisfying
to participants and more useful to decision-makers.309 Ideas from
deliberative democracy theory have been rolled out in the environmental
context. For instance, the EPA has taken various initiatives to incorporate
consensus building into participatory mechanisms and has increasingly
reached out to invite early participation, rather than waiting for the public to
come to the agency.310 Agencies have used strategies to make information
more accessible and user-friendly to the public and to engage the public in
compliance monitoring.311 Agencies have also put an emphasis on
multiparty collaborative processes and engaged with conflict resolution
experts.312 Deliberative workshops that merge social impacts with
ecological and biophysical concepts have been held.313
To be sure, public participation models that promote environmental justice
are easier to state than achieve. A leading study by Professors Dorothy M.
Daley and Tony G. Reames314 found that the EPA “has had some success in
expanding the conversation, improving access to information, and forging
new partnerships with communities,” but that “more work remains, as the
scope of environmental justice problems is large,”315 “participation from
minority and low-income communities remains uneven,” and there are
306. Dodge, supra note 291, at 228 (“When an actor imposes a frame, he/she exercises
coercive, ‘power over’ by placing constraints on the form and/or content of communication,
thus prioritizing some actions, arguments, or actors over others.”).
307. BEIERLE & CAYFORD, supra note 149, at 64.
308. NAT’L ENV’T JUST. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 288, at 4.
309. See COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY, COLLABORATION IN NEPA: A HANDBOOK FOR
NEPA PRACTITIONERS 3 (2007), https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/get-involved/Collaboration_in_
NEPA_Oct2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/CPD9-TE6T] (“Public involvement practices and
techniques have evolved considerably since Congress passed NEPA in 1970.”); see also
Foster, supra note 273, at 459–61.
310. See Nancy Perkins Spyke, Public Participation in Environmental Decisionmaking at
the New Millennium: Structuring New Spheres of Public Influence, 26 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L.
REV. 263, 287 (1999).
311. See id. at 299–300.
312. See generally COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY, supra note 309, at 45–60.
313. See Amanda L. Bentley Brymer, Joseph D. Holbrook, Ryan J. Niemeyer, Alexis A.
Suazo, J.D. Wulfhorst, Kerri T. Vierling, Beth A. Newingham, Timothy E. Link & Janet L.
Rachlow, A Social-Ecological Impact Assessment for Public Lands Management: Application
of a Conceptual and Methodological Framework, 21 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 3, 2016, at 9.
314. Daley & Reames, supra note 271.
315. Id. at 158.
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“challenges of creating systemic change in large bureaucracies.”316 Their
research confirms findings from prior studies that “effective participation is
characterized by clear goals, adequate human and financial capital
investment, consistent institutional commitment, and an ability for
participation to affect change in all stages of decision making.” 317 These
studies suggest that as AIAs are implemented, government agencies and
private companies will need to be attentive to the way in which they design
participatory processes, such as by providing for the involvement of
stakeholders in foundational decisions.
Of course, these analyses of participatory processes do not answer the
question of whether the EIS process has an articulable impact on outcomes,
which is more difficult to measure. Still, empirical studies have concluded
that the process “does appear to produce final decisions that are substantially
less impactful on the environment when compared to initially proposed
projects.”318 Internally, the EIS process might push agencies to engage in
more sustainable decision-making, while externally, the increased
transparency and public input may push agencies toward better results.319 It
also appears that the process pushes agencies to abandon certain projects,
knowing that they cannot survive the EIS gauntlet.320 Ideally, an AIA
requirement will similarly shape algorithmic outcomes to better serve the
public.
B. The War on Poverty
Public participation was a centerpiece of the community action programs
(CAPs) established by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964321 (EOA) as
part of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty.322 The federally
316. Id. at 165.
317. Id.
318. Ruple & Capone, supra note 243, at 50; see also ROBERT G. DREHER, NEPA UNDER
SIEGE: THE POLITICAL ASSAULT ON THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 4 (2005)
(“Examples are legion in which proposed federal actions that would have had serious
environmental consequences were dramatically improved, or even in some instances
abandoned, as a result of the NEPA process.”); Daniel R. Mandelker, The National
Environmental Policy Act: A Review of Its Experience and Problems, 32 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 293, 294 (2012) (“[A] legion of studies . . . [mostly] conclude that NEPA has had a
moderately positive effect.”).
319. Ruple & Capone, supra note 243, at 47.
320. “NEPA’s most significant effect has been to deter federal agencies from bringing
forward proposed projects that could not withstand public examination and debate.” Dreher,
supra note 318, at 6. Since the enactment of NEPA, agencies “have been more likely to
modify projects in light of expressed concerns and to consider alternatives proposed by
interested citizens.” Fromherz, supra note 246, at 133.
321. Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (repealed 1981). The act also created a federal job
corps and work-training programs and expanded preschool, community health, and legal
services programs. See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Civil Rights Canon: Above and Below,
123 YALE L.J. 2698, 2730 (2014).
322. See Tara J. Melish, Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor: New Governance,
New Accountability, and a 21st Century War on the Sources of Poverty, 13 YALE HUM. RTS.
& DEV. L.J. 1, 3 (2010). The act represented the “economic citizenship agenda” of the civil
rights movement. Brown-Nagin, supra note 321, at 2734.
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funded and locally administered CAPs were part of an economic justice
strategy designed “to provide stimulation and incentive for urban and rural
communities to mobilize their resources to combat poverty.”323 CAPs were
tasked with “assessing local needs in employment, child and adult education,
health, social welfare, or legal services, and with devising strategies and
administering programs to address those community needs.”324 Importantly,
the EOA required that CAPs operate “with the maximum feasible
participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups served.”325
As President Johnson stated, “local citizens best understand their own
problems, and know best how to deal with those problems.”326 Indeed, at the
time of the EOA’s passage, the concept of participatory democracy was “in
the air,” circulated in New Left movements, philanthropic organizations, and
academia.327 By February 1968, the United States had 1,600 community
action agencies (CAAs) carrying out CAPs across the country.328
However, as low-income, Black Americans began mobilizing in CAAs,
they began challenging existing local political structures, which almost
immediately329 created a “political firestorm.”330 Because CAP funding
flowed from the federal government directly to the CAPs, bypassing state
and local gatekeepers,331 mayors were fearful of losing opportunities for
political patronage and facing challenges from new political coalitions.332
White backlash blamed CAAs for fomenting the urban uprisings of the

323. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 § 2. “CAAs were to be federally created entities,
entitled to federal funding for ninety percent of their program costs for the first two years of
operation, after which the percentage of federal funds would decrease.” Melish, supra note
322, at 24.
324. Brown-Nagin, supra note 321, at 2731–32.
325. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 § 2. The participatory mandate provided a way
to bypass profound resistance among southern politicians to any programs that might threaten
the perpetuation of segregation and racial capitalism. Melish, supra note 322, at 22.
326. Special Message to Congress Proposing a Nationwide War on the Sources of Poverty,
1 PUB. PAPERS 375 (Mar. 16, 1964).
327. Melish, supra note 322, at 18. “The concept was simple: those most affected by social
disadvantage—‘the indigenous disadvantaged’—were necessarily better positioned to
understand poverty’s causes, to identify the most effective solutions to them, and to advocate
their own communities’ interests than were ‘outside’ middleclass professional reformers
lacking any direct experience with those conditions.” Id.
328. Id. at 26; Brown-Nagin, supra note 321, at 2734 (they “enabled local people to build
clinics, preschools, and community centers and to provide food relief—in short, to begin the
work of revitalizing their communities”).
329. See Melish, supra note 322, at 26–27.
330. Wendy A. Bach, Mobilization and Poverty Law: Searching for Participatory
Democracy Amongst the Ashes of the War on Poverty, 20 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 96, 131–32
(2012); see also Melish, supra note 322, at 27; see also NOEL A. CAZENAVE, IMPOSSIBLE
DEMOCRACY: THE UNLIKELY SUCCESS OF THE WAR ON POVERTY COMMUNITY ACTION
PROGRAMS 5 (2007) (people of color “demanded a greater role in the decision making that
affected their day-to-day lives”).
331. McFarlane, supra note 145, at 874 (“This mobilization and organization backed by
the federal government upset the political balance in cities around the country.”).
332. See CAZENAVE, supra note 330, at 14; McFarlane, supra note 145, at 872–73.
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era.333 By 1967, Congress shifted control of the CAAs to local
governments,334 putting “an end to federally funded community action as a
major resource for social change.”335 And, by 1974, the federal agency
overseeing the CAAs was dismantled.336
The legacy of the EOA’s participatory mandate is a complicated one. On
the one hand, the “maximum feasible participation” mandate was officially
terminated, and the concept has been derided from multiple corners, accused
of “being unsubstantiated and misconstrued, politically motivated as a ploy
to co-opt social activism, or simply ineffective in assisting the poor.”337 And
of course, the War on Poverty was not won, although it reduced poverty
significantly. On the other hand, where it worked, the “maximum feasible
participation” requirement was “socially transformative.”338 As Professor
Tomiko Brown-Nagin reflects, “[i]n many communities, [the act] provided
the first occasion when people of widely different backgrounds—rich and
poor, Black and white, urban and rural—sat down together to work on
common problems and design programs.”339 CAAs also served as “training
grounds for many minorities, developing their capacity and thereby
increasing their access to new opportunities.”340 Indeed, as Professor Noel
A. Cazenave states, the political backlash to CAAs resulted “because they
succeeded well beyond the expectations of their planners, not because they
failed.”341 In Professor Wendy A. Bach’s study of the history of the
“maximum feasible participation” mandate in Durham, North Carolina,
between 1965 and 1970, she concludes that where the mandate worked, it
was due to hard-law requirements for participation, combined with
administrative flexibility in implementation, along with federal funding for
independent activist organizations.342 In Durham, these commitments served
as “a catalyst both for leadership development in poor communities and an
opportunity to create programs that were responsive to their needs in the view
of community controlled organizations.”343

333. See Martha J. Bailey & Nicolas J. Duquette, How Johnson Fought the War on Poverty:
The Economics and Politics of Funding at the Office of Economic Opportunity, 74 J. ECON.
HIST. 351 (2014); CAZENAVE, supra note 330, at 155–56.
334. See CAZENAVE, supra note 330, at 167–68.
335. Id. at 168.
336. See Melish, supra note 322, at 27; Howard Nemon, Community Action: Lessons from
Forty Years of Federal Funding, Anti-Poverty Strategies, and the Participation of the Poor,
11 J. POVERTY 1, 5 (2007).
337. Nemon, supra note 336, at 14.
338. Brown-Nagin, supra note 321, at 2732; see also Bach, supra note 330, at 100–01;
CAZENAVE, supra note 330, at 172.
339. Brown-Nagin, supra note 321, at 2732 (quoting ROBERT F. CLARK, THE WAR ON
POVERTY: HISTORY, SELECTED PROGRAMS AND ONGOING IMPACT 44 (2002)).
340. Nemon, supra note 336, at 15.
341. CAZENAVE, supra note 330, at 172.
342. Bach, supra note 330, at 136–51.
343. Id. at 139.
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Today, over 1,000 CAAs are operating,344 primarily to deliver social
services.345 Public participation in CAAs is ensured through a federally
mandated formula that allocates one-third of seats each to community,
government, and private sector representatives.346 The struggle to ensure
that participation is meaningful continues; one nationwide evaluation of
CAAs concluded that “participation leads to a redistribution of power only
when local residents and organizations are engaged in problem definition,
decision making, implementation, and evaluation.”347 Many CAAs remain
committed to enhancing participatory opportunities, such as by conducting
regular community forums for providing information and soliciting feedback
or training community residents in advocacy strategies.348 Outside the CAA
structure, the citizen participation movement in urban politics lives on in
multiple grassroots organizations.349 Public participation is also a norm in
many other anti-poverty programs, such as public housing350 and workforce
investment.351
According to Professor Tara J. Melish, a key takeaway with regard to the
demise of the “maximum feasible participation” mandate is that its structure
did not fit within the social context of its time.352 The mandate itself reflected
conflicting values: was it designed merely to serve the poor, to transform
their supposed “apathy,” or to mobilize them to seize power?353 There were
adherents to all these views, but none was ascendant. Moreover, as Melish
explains, CAAs were squeezed between two irreconcilable trends—
bureaucratic centralization at the federal level and “increasing militancy and
rights absolutism of the civil and welfare rights movements.”354
By contrast, today’s regulatory systems are increasingly shaped in the
“new governance” mold, which in turn may create opportunities for
meaningful public participation within algorithmic systems and privacy
law.355 New governance is both a descriptive and a normative theory that
offers an alternative to the top-down, centralized regulatory structures
associated with New Deal programs, which are seen as too rigid for modern

344. See CAZENAVE, supra note 330, at 2; Nemon, supra note 336, at 2.
345. See Nemon, supra note 336, at 5; Brown-Nagin, supra note 321, at 2736.
346. See Nemon, supra note 336, at 3–4, 16. “By strengthening local government control,
limiting local participation, and augmenting social service activity, this legislation had a
long-lasting impact on community action.” Id. at 4.
347. Id. at 3.
348. See id. at 17.
349. CAZENAVE, supra note 330, at 169. “The community action programs of the 1960s
raised the expectations of people previously left out of urban decision-making processes to
such a magnitude that no congressional amendment or shift in federal funding priorities could
return them to their pre–War on Poverty status.” Id. at 181.
350. See generally Lee, supra note 197.
351. See generally Bach, supra note 196.
352. See Melish, supra note 322, at 27.
353. Bach, supra note 330, at 119–22; see also Melish, supra note 322, at 18; CAZENAVE,
supra note 330, at 140.
354. Melish, supra note 322, at 27.
355. See Bach, supra note 196, at 255–57; Melish, supra note 322, at 30–34.
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conditions of complexity and uncertainty.356 The hallmarks of new
governance are flexibility and innovation, public/private collaboration,
decentralized and local decision-making, and adaptation of programs over
time in line with experience and evaluation.357 In this model, “government
acts . . . as a facilitator of the experimentalist enterprise,”358 and
accountability is derived in part from involving numerous stakeholders, who
give the process “a richer and more effective form of democratic participation
on the relevant issues than is possible through voting in general elections.”359
As Professor Orly Lobel, the chief chronicler of the theory, explains, new
governance “is a regime based on engaging multiple actors and shifting
citizens from passive to active roles.”360 Participation is not only about
implementing policy, but also enhancing “the ability of citizens to participate
in political and civic life.”361
Because the existing data privacy regime (and many algorithmic
accountability proposals) contains features of the new governance mold,362
it is possible that adapting public participation norms to privacy law will be
less controversial and more feasible than the Economic Opportunity Act’s
participation mandate and its highly politicized downfall. In other words,
when it comes to today’s privacy law, there may be a better fit between
regulatory structure and social context. Existing privacy law already shares
some new governance features. Professors Kenneth A. Bamberger and
Deirdre K. Mulligan describe the new governance structures within
American consumer privacy law, as enforced by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and state regulators overseeing data breach notification
statutes.363 For instance, the FTC has collaborated with numerous
stakeholders to respond to privacy concerns arising in the online
marketplace.364 In so doing, it has exercised its discretion and turned to an
array of new-governance “regulatory tools outside the enforcement context,
notably publicity, research, best-practice guidance, the encouragement of
certification regimes, the enlistment of expert input, and numerous
deliberative and participatory processes promoting dialogue with advocates,

356. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 405–06 (2004); see also Melish, supra
note 322, at 3–5.
357. Orly Lobel, New Governance as Regulatory Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF GOVERNANCE 65, 65 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012).
358. Bach, supra note 196, at 256.
359. William H. Simon, Part II: New Governance Anxieties: A Deweyan Response, 2010
WIS. L. REV. 727, 736.
360. Lobel, supra note 356, at 373.
361. Id. at 374.
362. See Selbst, supra note 30, at 155 (“A regulation requiring companies to perform AIAs
would be an example of a collaborative governance approach.”). Environmental law is notable
for its new-governance structures. See Lobel, supra note 356, at 345.
363. Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, New Governance, Chief Privacy
Officers, and the Corporate Management of Information Privacy in the United States: An
Initial Inquiry, 33 LAW & POL’Y 477, 478 (2011).
364. See id. at 484.
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industry, and academia.”365 At the same time, state data breach notification
laws expanded transparency of corporate privacy practices366 and spurred
businesses to operationalize privacy practices within the firm, managed by
officers and employees committed to privacy tools.367 These multiple sites
of privacy enforcement and oversight within flexible parameters are
hallmarks of new governance.
Of course, the current privacy regime, with its strong tilt toward
self-regulation, has proven largely ineffective at protecting individuals’ data
privacy, suggesting the need for an ongoing role for rights-based laws,
federal oversight, and concrete enforcement tools.368 For its part, the GDPR
blends a rights-based framework with new governance administration.
Under the GDPR, the EU and member state–level data protection authorities
have issued broad guidance, leaving businesses to fill in the details with
experience, “whether formally by establishing codes of conduct or
certification mechanisms . . . or informally through self-regulation, recording
and reporting, impact assessments, and ongoing conversations with
regulators.”369 Enforcement authority is shared among individuals, civil
society groups, data enforcement authorities at the national level;
coordination of these groups occurs at the EU level.370 And, as discussed
earlier, the GDPR calls for input by citizens when businesses and government
agencies conduct internal data impact assessments, a form of stakeholder
collaboration that is a typical feature of new governance.
As the U.S. Congress considers comprehensive privacy legislation in the
shadow of the GDPR, it is likely that any law that emerges will reflect some
aspects of new governance theory. As a result, privacy law in this mode
might be more amenable to public participation than the highly contested
terrain of anti-poverty programs. In fact, the concept of AIAs—and their
increasing prominence in data privacy proposals—reflects new governance’s
emphasis on bottom-up, decentralized processes and adjustments in response
to ongoing monitoring and stakeholder feedback. Still, a core challenge of
new governance is including marginalized people in collaborative “situations
of pervasive competition, power imbalances, and limited resources.”371
These dynamics are heightened given the massive profits at stake in the
big-data economy. There is “a fundamental conflict between the interests of
the companies that want to maximize profits and the public that bears the
burden of the externalities of these profit-making enterprises.”372 Reflecting
365. Id.
366. See id.
367. See id. at 504.
368. See generally Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323
(2009). See also David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism
and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2008).
369. Anupam Chander, Margot E. Kaminsky & William McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy
Law, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1733, 1760 (2021).
370. See id. at 1759–60.
371. Lobel, supra note 356, at 458.
372. Jason M. Solomon, Law and Governance in the 21st Century Regulatory State, 86
TEX. L. REV. 819, 836 (2008).
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on the experience of public participation within the EOA and its successors,
social welfare statutes, is essential. Professor Jaime A. Lee, who has
extensively studied public participation mandates in anti-poverty programs,
highlights two preconditions for participation within new governance
regimes: “[A]ll participants must be motivated toward a common goal, and
second, they must recognize what the other participants contribute to that
goal.”373 Importantly, she adds, “[t]he recognition that meaningful
participation by marginalized stakeholders does not inevitably occur, but
requires intervention, is an important one as it is frequently overlooked,
leaving the model susceptible to producing merely cosmetic processes.”374
Thus, for public participation in data-centric regimes to be meaningful for
marginalized communities, it is necessary to provide financial and technical
support to grassroots organizations fighting for data justice, to intentionally
design participatory processes with the input of disadvantaged communities,
to yield space for disadvantaged persons to define their own privacy needs,
and to bring multiple stakeholders together for engaged problem-solving,
oversight, and enforcement.
C. Land Use
Public participation is also a long-standing feature of land use
decision-making.375
Here, the “disconnect between principle and
practice”376 echoes the mixed history of public participation requirements
within environmental decision-making and social welfare programs. Land
use is traditionally a local issue. Local governments have the responsibility
to maintain a functioning city through “planning, financing, and developing
a variety of commercial and residential facilities, amenities, and uses of
land.”377 Localities regulate land use through a variety of mechanisms, such
as zoning.378 In addition, they may engage in public/private development
projects, and they implement federally funded projects focused on economic
and community development. In these various processes, the public has
formal opportunities to be heard. Indeed, “[p]articipation or voice is a
particularly venerable legitimator of local government.”379 Given the current
vacuum of federal privacy regulation, local jurisdictions are increasingly
regulating privacy, making them potentially important sites for implementing
public participation norms. Looking at the experience of public participation
in land use decision-making is thus highly relevant.

373. Lee, supra note 16, at 407.
374. Id. at 434.
375. See McFarlane, supra note 145, at 867–68.
376. Id. at 864.
377. Id. at 866.
378. Foster, supra note 256, at 46.
379. Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of
Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 883–85 (1983) (discussing the strong anti-federalist
strain of thought that persists in “American discussions of local government”).
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As far back as 1926, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued the model
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act,380 which was widely adopted by states
across the country.381 The code recommended the requirement of a public
hearing, open to all citizens, at least fifteen days prior to a zoning code’s
adoption or revision.382 Public hearings are also the norm when local
governments make site-specific decisions, called adjustment decisions,
which can exempt certain projects from zoning requirements or grant
conditional uses. Since the participatory revolution of the 1970s, “[e]ach
year, thousands of neighbors, and others, appear before zoning boards to
voice support or, more commonly, opposition to zoning changes or special
exceptions/variances regarding specific development projects.”383 Despite
the positive rhetoric of community control, participatory processes can be
subverted by organized interests opposed to increased density or other
development characteristics.384 These “Not in My Backyard” (NIMBY)
campaigns can result in a small and vocal portion of a community
undermining local-government attempts to increase affordable housing.385
Professor Anika Singh Lemar warns about the harms of over-participation,
such as when affluent residents with power overwhelm people suffering from
disadvantages in land use hearings.386
Participatory opportunities in land use decision-making often fail to meet
the deliberative ideal387 because the standard model of public participation
in land use is the public hearing. This provides for one-way communications
from local government officials to the public or from the public to
government officials, without dialogue. Hearings are often structured in
ways that limit opportunities for input, such as when hearings are held in
inconvenient locations and/or during work hours, require advance sign-ups,

380. U.S. DEP’T OF COM., STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (1926),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-C13-18b3b6e632119b6d94779f558b9d
3873/pdf/GOVPUB-C13-18b3b6e632119b6d94779f558b9d3873.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3LK6-XMSL].
381. Id. at 1. On various goals that local governments may have with regard to zoning, see
Christopher Serkin, Divergence in Land Use Regulations and Property Rights, 92 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1055, 1059–61 (2019).
382. U.S. DEP’T OF COM., supra note 381, at 7–8.
383. Wendell Pritchett & Shitong Qiao, Exclusionary Megacities, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 467,
492 (2018). “These small adjustments are the everyday fare of local land regulations.” Rose,
supra note 379, at 841; see also Daniel P. Selmi, The Contract Transformation in Land Use
Regulation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 591, 637 (2011).
384. John Infranca, The New State Zoning: Land Use Preemption amid a Housing Crisis,
60 B.C. L. REV. 823, 831 (2019).
385. Id. at 831; Pritchett & Qiao, supra note 383, at 493 (“Many legal practitioners,
developers, and academics have come to criticize the ‘neighborhood veto’ for its role in
impeding development and exacerbating related economic and racial segregation.”).
386. See Anika Singh Lemar, Overparticipation: Designing Effective Land Use Public
Processes, 90 FORDHAM L. REV. 1083 (2021).
387. See McFarlane, supra note 145, at 864; Matthew J. Parlow, Civic Republicanism,
Public Choice Theory, and Neighborhood Councils: A New Model for Civic Engagement, 79
U. COLO. L. REV. 137, 141–42 (2008).
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and limit time to speak.388 Further, hearings are typically held after the local
government has already settled on a plan (or negotiated one with a
developer),389 making the process one of “decide, announce, and defend” in
lieu of a “true discussion or engagement of the public in a deliberative
decision making process.”390 Public officials face financial pressures to push
developments forward, and property owners hold the purse strings.391 From
their perspective, public participation can raise the specter of delays,
disruptions, and wasted time.392 The “democracy-deficient approach” of
public hearings “yields predictable results: immediate and generous benefits
for the developers; costs borne by taxpayers; promised benefits to the general
public, inchoate and unrealized, and inequitably spread.”393 Moreover, as
with other participatory systems, a core challenge is how to meaningfully
involve disadvantaged communities despite differences in race and class,
especially given that discourse “marginalizes those who do not talk or those
who talk in marginalized ways.”394
It is useful to contrast these failures with another urban planning tool called
participatory budgeting. Participatory budgeting involves giving citizens
opportunities to discuss and decide how a portion of the municipal budget
should be spent.395 It arose in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre in the 1970s,
heavily influenced by Paulo Freire’s theories in Pedagogy of the Oppressed,
388. Bezdek, supra note 146, at 27; see also McFarlane, supra note 145, at 917 (“[M]any
participatory schemes are either too broad or too narrow, implemented too late, or required to
take place so rapidly that they are doomed to be ineffective, alienating, and
counter-productive.”); Damon Y. Smith, Participatory Planning and Procedural Protections:
The Case for Deeper Public Participation in Urban Redevelopment, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 243, 249 (2009) (“Municipalities and redevelopment officials reacted cynically to these
federal requirements and, in a legacy that endures to this day, often provided insufficient
notice of perfunctory hearings at times and locations inconvenient to those ultimately
impacted by the proposed redevelopment.”).
389. See Alejandro E. Comacho, Community Benefit Agreements: A Symptom, Not the
Antidote, of Bilateral Land Use Regulation, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 355, 360–61 (2013); see also
Selmi, supra note 383, at 640.
390. Bezdek, supra note 146, at 27; see also Edward W. De Barbieri, Urban Anticipatory
Governance, 46 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 75, 84–86 (2018); see also Douglas A. Jorden & Michele
A. Hentrich, Public Participation Is on the Rise: A Review of the Changes in the Notice and
Hearing Requirements for the Adoption and Amendment of General Plans and Rezonings
Nationwide and in Recent Arizona Land Use Legislation, 43 NAT. RES. J. 865, 873 (2003).
391. Bezdek, supra note 146, at 47.
392. McFarlane, supra note 145, at 864.
393. Bezdek, supra note 146, at 47; cf. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Structure of the
Land Use Regulatory System in the United States, 22 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 441, 475 (2007)
(“Simplistic structural models at either extreme of this conflict’s spectrum—that powerful and
wealthy development and business interests control local land use policy or that
growth-distrusting local homeowners who vote in local elections to protect their property
interests control local land use policy—fail to convey the many ways by which power over
land use is exercised, contested, and shared.”).
394. McFarlane, supra note 145, at 915.
395. See HOLLIE GILMAN, PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING AND CIVIC TECH: THE REVIVAL OF
CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT 5–6 (2016); see also Gianpaolo Baiocchi & Ernesto Ganuza,
Participatory Budgeting: As If Emancipation Mattered, 42 POL. & SOC. 29, 32 (2014); Yves
Cabannes, Participatory Budgeting: A Significant Contribution to Participatory Democracy,
16 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 27 (2004).
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which conceived of liberatory dialogue as “an act of creation; it must not
serve as a crafty instrument for the domination of one person by another.”396
Participatory budgeting has been heavily studied.397 In Porto Alegre,
thousands of poor residents became deeply involved in government for the
first time,398 “diligently coming to meetings week after week to debate the
arcana of municipal finances and regulations as they decided on investment
priorities for their neighborhoods, boroughs, and the city itself.”399 People
learned how to “navigate the complex process and devise strategies that
mitigate stark social differences.”400 Improvements in the quality of life
were dramatic: sanitation service coverage rose from 49 to 98 percent in
eight years, half of the unpaved streets were paved, student enrollment
doubled, public housing was built, and bus service expanded to previously
neglected neighborhoods.401 Participatory budgeting “has been shown to
improve governance, reinforce democracy, and contribute significantly to the
well-being of the poorest citizens.”402 It has spread across the world,403
including to at least a dozen cities in the United States.404 However, its
format—and accordingly, its transformative potential—differs widely by
jurisdiction.405 Pateman views participatory budgeting (in its most robust
396. PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 89 (Myra Bergman Ramos trans.,
Bloomsbury 2018) (2000).
397. See BRIAN WAMPLER, PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING IN BRAZIL: CONTESTATION,
COOPERATION, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 6, 27 (2010). “Participatory Budgeting has been the
subject of dozens of international exchange programs, literally hundreds of conferences, and
has been the primary reason for the existence (and funding) of several NGOs that promote and
help implement it.” Ernesto Ganuza & Gianpaolo Baiocchi, The Power of Ambiguity: How
Participatory Budgeting Travels the Globe, 8 J. PUB. DELIBERATION, no. 2, 2012, at 1, 1.
398. “Porto Alegre grew from a small number of participants, just 976 in 1990, to an
average of 35,000 a year between 2001 and 2004. The [Porto Alegre working party]
government invested heavily in mobilizing individuals to participate.” Brian Wampler, When
Does Participatory Democracy Deepen the Quality of Democracy?: Lessons from Brazil, 41
COMPAR. POL. 61, 71 (2008).
399. Ganuza & Baiocchi, supra note 397, at 6; see also WAMPLER, supra note 397, at 34.
400. WAMPLER, supra note 397, at 32.
401. Josh Lerner, Participatory Budgeting: Building Community Agreement Around
Tough Budget Decisions, 100 NAT’L CIVIC REV. 30, 30 (2011).
402. GILMAN, supra note 395, at 6.
403. See Cabannes, supra note 395, at 27.
404. See GILMAN, supra note 395, at 8–14; see also Lerner, supra note 401, at 32–35
(discussing participatory budgeting in Chicago); Alexa Kasdan & Erin Markman,
Participatory Budgeting and Community-Based Research: Principles, Practices, and
Implications for Impact Validity, 39 NEW POL. SCI. 143, 146 (2017) (discussing participatory
budgeting in New York City). The practice spread to a dozen cities by 2015; and “[alt]hough
[participatory budgeting] has grown rapidly in the US, most processes are still limited to
relatively small and constrained budget funds.” Madeleine Pape & Josh Lerner, Budgeting for
Equity: How Can Participatory Budgeting Advance Equity in the United States?, 12 J. PUB.
DELIBERATION, no. 2, 2016, at 1, 10.
405. See Baiocchi & Ganuza, supra note 395, at 29; see also Adalmir Marquetti, Carols E.
Schonerwald da Silva & Al Campbell, Participatory Economic Democracy in Action:
Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre, 1989–2004, 44 REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 62 (2011).
Professor Brian Wampler writes that the core components of successful participatory
budgeting are “high levels of mayoral support, a civil society that can engage in both
cooperation and contestation, and rules that delegate specific types of direct authority to
citizens.” WAMPLER, supra note 397, at 35.
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form) as a prime example of participatory democracy in action because it
transfers decision-making power to citizens.406 This transformative potential
is largely missing in land use decision-making.
Not surprisingly, where public participation in land use decision-making
has had a meaningful impact for marginalized communities, it has tended to
be in forms other than the formal hearing process. In various settings,
neighborhood residents have asserted themselves in planning processes,
gaining expertise and using an array of techniques, including design
charettes, impact assessments, land use mapping, and visual survey
techniques.407 Many neighborhoods operate community development
corporations that allow them to direct their own neighborhood
development.408 In line with these innovative strategies, experts agree that
relying solely on a post-planning public hearing model is inadequate.
Surveying the literature and real-life examples, Bezdek concludes that
meaningful public participation requires purposeful design of participatory
processes, public involvement early in the planning process, transparency as
to how the process will unfold and who will be involved, and inclusive and
equitable outreach to “members of communities historically burdened by
mal-distributed environmental and economic siting decisions.”409 Professor
Audrey McFarlane stresses that public participation requires “hard law,”
rather than soft norms, along with enforcement mechanisms so that
communities have leverage to ensure that participatory requirements are
followed.410 As Arnstein established decades ago, participation and power
are intertwined and often in tension. Without attending to this friction, public
participation in the datafied society is doomed to fail.
CONCLUSION
Public participation is touted as a desirable addition to regulating
algorithmic systems, particularly with regard to the emerging tool of
algorithmic impact assessments. This results from an increasing recognition
that data-centric technologies have disproportionately harmful impacts on
marginalized people. Yet, public participation in the datafied society has
been undertheorized and risks becoming a form of “window dressing,” in
which the views of marginalized people are solicited and then ignored, while
giving cover to the entities that deploy the systems. In designing public
406. Carole Pateman, Participatory Democracy Revisited, 10 PERSPS. ON POL. 7, 10 (2012).
407. See Arnold, supra note 393, at 476; see also Bezdek, supra note 146, at 6.
408. Lemar, supra note 386, at 1097 (“For decades, the community development
movement furthered accountable development by undertaking projects directed by community
residents acting through locally controlled nonprofit, mission-motivated organizations.”).
409. Bezdek, supra note 146, at 50; see also McFarlane, supra note 145, at 930–31.
410. McFarlane, supra note 145, at 929–31. Similarly, in a detailed study of HOPE VI, a
federally funded program that redeveloped public housing into mixed-income developments,
Professor Lisa T. Alexander writes: “[A] healthy balance between traditional public law and
new governance approaches may be necessary to achieve innovation in social reform under
circumstances of conflict.” Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance:
Lessons from Chicago’s Public Housing Reform Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL’Y 117, 175 (2009).
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participation mechanisms for the datafied society, we do not need to start
from scratch. There are ample lessons from other regulatory regimes that
similarly impact the needs and interests of marginalized people.
Public participation mandates in the areas of environmental regulation,
anti-poverty programs, and land use have a mixed record in terms of
empowerment and equity. When they work, it is because the participatory
mechanisms themselves were intentionally designed with input from
impacted communities. Moreover, public participation is more likely to be
meaningful when logistical barriers to participation are removed, the
expertise of impacted communities is valued, the law contains enforceable
requirements for participation, capacity building is part of the participatory
plan, and the public has an opportunity to shape outcomes rather than to
simply comment on a preexisting plan. Public participation is also an
ongoing process; it needs to be included at all phases of a project, from the
decision to adopt an algorithmic system, to design and development, to
deployment, to ongoing monitoring. Of course, we also need to expand our
vision beyond existing public participation regimes and their largely analog
methods. There is emerging research on public participation tools in
algorithmic systems, including technologies for engaging citizens, such as
platforms for crowdsourcing, civic consultation, online petitions, and online
citizen panels.411
Public participation is most essential with regard to algorithmic systems
that can adversely impact people, that is, leave them worse off than if they
had never been subject to the system. Thus, it should be incorporated into
both public and private systems that risk disparate impacts on people
protected by antidiscrimination laws. In addition, public input can improve
automated decision-making systems that act as gatekeepers to basic, human
needs, such as those that determine access to housing, employment, health
care, education, financial services, and public benefits. Other systems that
would benefit from public input include those that deploy novel technologies
that rely on personal data, such as biometric systems, those that rely on
sensitive categories of data, those that surveil marginalized communities, and
those that implicate ethical dilemmas, such as computer assisted vehicles.
The stakes go beyond individual people. Our communities are stronger when
algorithmic systems are designed with justice and equity in mind. Without
public input into the data-centric technologies shaping our lives, democracy
itself is at risk. Thus, to move beyond window dressing is to open the
window to a better future for everyone.
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